15¢ AUGUST 29, 1949

New Republic

BRITAIN'S NEW CRISIS: WHAT CAN WE DO TO HELP?

AN EDITORIAL

- **THE MIDDLE CLASS NEEDS HOUSES TOO**

By CATHERINE BAUER

- **FOUR ABSOLUTE MONARCHS IN VIENNA**

By CHARLES G. BOLTE

- **THE UN JUGGLES THE ATOM**

By HOMER METZ

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

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

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New Republic

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WASHINGTON WIRE

THE UNPREDICTABLE 81st Congress again has worked its way to some surprising conclusions. Last week the House voted to strengthen the anti-trust laws. Most newspapers printed not a line about that significant action. But it so happens that Southern Democrats are against monopoly. They voted overwhelmingly with Fair Deal Democrats.

On the debit side of the record, the strangest debate took place in the Senate on the President's proposal to create a Department of Welfare. Fair Dealers like Senators Murray (D, Mont.) and Humphrey (D, Minn.) led the fight for the Administration with many words of praise for former President Hoover. On the other side were such men as Senators Taft (R, O.) and McClellan (D. Ark.)—who are usually with Hoover—saying that the former President really didn't know what he was talking about. Actually, the debate was the opening argument in Congress over compulsory health insurance. Those opposed to health insurance won by a vote of 60 to 32. The President's Welfare Department proposal was killed despite the support of Hoover.

After the notable anti-monopoly victory, the House turned around and slapped the Administration hard. The vote to cut the military-aid program in half was one of the worst blows dealt Administration foreign policy by the 81st Congress. It was unexpected.

Nathan Robertson has broken a story in his column for the Labor Press Association that is as sensational in its way as the disclosures about five percenters. It is reminiscent of the recent stories of how a large number of Illinois newspaper editors accepted payment from former Governor Green's Republican administration.

In a confidential bulletin, the Minnesota Editorial Association recently advised its members: "This is one of the most significant items your MEA Bulletin has ever carried, though we fervently hope that enthusiasm over relaxed medical ethics will not encourage even the momentary impairment of newspaper ethics."

The editorial association then went on to inform its members that the House of Delegates of the Minnesota State Medical Association had met, discussed newspaper and public relations, and had adopted a resolution which noted that "one criticism frequently heard from the press is that the medical profession expects the press to maintain the entire burden of indirect publicity from the doctor to the public without remuneration." The resolution said, therefore, that "as long as this opinion exists, your committee believes that, with county medical society approval, doctors may place a professional card stating only the name, address, telephone number and office hours of the doctor in the local newspaper."

A communication from the medical society to the editorial association contained this morsel: "This resolution, we believe, is an important step in building up better relations with the press of our state. At our medical-press conference April 8, country editors particularly stressed the importance they attach to what they term 'a reciprocal arrangement' with the medical profession that would benefit both."

The American Society of Newspaper Editors received much praise for its investigation and condemnation of the scandal involving the Illinois editors. It should start an investigation into the Minnesota situation at once.

The Federal Trade Commission, which, with the Justice Department, is charged with enforcing the anti-trust laws, is almost out of commission. There's one vacancy on the

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five-man board; one member is seriously ill; one member is serving an interim appointment while Congress has pigeonholed his nomination for another term; one member's term expires next month and he has not been renominated, and the fifth member is 82 years old.

Best quote of the week about adjournment came from Senator Wherry (R, Neb.), who frequently blurts out the truth to the annoyance of his GOP colleagues. Senator Lucas (D, Ill.), who is not being swayed by the arguments for an early adjournment, says he's going to hold the boys in session until Thanksgiving if necessary. They don't like that sort of talk, and the reason is simple. Wherry remarked: "The longer we stay in session, the more social welfare and state control legislation we'll get."

Notes: Despite a law by Congress to the contrary, the House Appropriations Committee continues to hold its hearings in secret. After it concludes work on a bill, it publishes the transcript of the hearings, eliminating from the text any material it thinks should be kept secret. In one published report last week of a two-day hearing there were 15 notations: "Discussion off-the-record." . . . Senator Dulles (R, N. Y.), who is not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, has been permitted to sit with the committee during its hearings on military aid. Senator Connally (D, Tex.) has not tried to hide his feelings that Dulles is interfering too much.

General Douglas MacArthur's refusal to return home to report to the President and Congress is without parallel in a democracy. Has any other General been excused of the necessity of giving an accounting to representatives of the people? . . . The State Department encouraged the World Bank to make a loan to India. Nehru's prospective visit to President Truman will be used to advertise the importance with which Washington now regards India as a leader in Asia.

Washington T. R. B.

CORRESPONDENCE

Silver Lining

SIR: You seem to have missed the main point of the appointments of Clark and McGrath. They are a token that the President has not abandoned his stand on Civil Rights. In the mythology that the Dixiecrats have familiarized the morons with, these estimable gentlemen are sub-demons of "that terrible Truman." Even some who supported Truman in the election objected to the appointment. . . . But the people as a whole know what the President meant. They did another time.

CHARLES G. HAMILTON

Aberdeen, Miss.

The Blind Lead the Blind

SIR: The *NR's* article, "The Germans Are Saying—" by Charles G. Bolte (issue August 15), could and should be implemented by the recent outcome of West Germany's elections: tantamount to a success for the Neo-Fascists and equally a . . . failure of our occupation policy to "guide" the Germans toward our democratic "way of life." . . . Bolte pointed out rightly that Germans disagree among themselves—they even disagree inside themselves. . . . Equally important to the eternally raging disunity, now going into the second millennium, is the German's unrealistic "desire to attain incompatible objects," as Bolte pointedly phrased this puberty symptom.

It seems to be apparent that this desire found its reflection in the recent elections. However, equally apparent seems to be our blindness to the . . . political handwritings on the wall. I do not believe that we can excuse our failure to deal with the Germans fairly and squarely with another failure that we are being stopped by the Russians. . . . Today we dismantle Germany's factories and arrest the small fry, tomorrow we put former Nazi bigwigs in their old or even better positions.

They cannot figure us out. Can you?

HANS A. ILLING

Los Angeles, Calif.

Wages and Strikes

SIR: I am a retired locomotive engineer. Having carried a union card for 50 years, your article of August 1 on Dave Beck, labor leader on the Pacific Coast . . .challenged my attention. The article on Dave Beck I wouldn't consider very flattering to him, but let us look at the record and compare it with other labor leaders. John L. Lewis, Reuther, Green and Murray only seem to know one thing and that is to go back once a year for more wages; that is their cure for everything. Beck brought his men through the war without a strike and there has been no strike since the war that I know of by the teamsters on the Pacific Coast. Perhaps he has his faults but his methods show that he does not consider strife between labor and capital to be inevitable or even necessary, at least not once a year. . . . No labor leader who puts his men on the firing line every year is a good one.

We do know that the relations between labor and capital have worsened since the end of the war. The fact that working men cannot buy even as much with their wages as ten years ago should teach our labor leaders that wages are not the answer. The fourth round of wage increases, or the third or second or first, is futile. . . . I firmly believe that labor is strong enough if used rightly to bring down the cost of living any time it sets out to do so. They have a weapon more effective than any strike, and one which they have never used, at least through their organizations. They leave it to a few housewives' organizations. When one looks back after 50 years as a union man the picture is most disheartening.

JAMES S. LOGAN

Spokane, Wash.

Wrong College

SIR: In the section headed "The Week" in your issue of August 8, 1949, this sentence is in the story about the "Democratic Comeback": "Professors at Millsaps College unofficially informed students that attending the [Democratic Party] forum would mean not being graduated." This statement almost certainly is untrue. The dean knows nothing about such a warning, no professor that I have talked to knows anything about such a warning, and the statement in the *New Republic* sounds ridiculous to those who know the college. . . .

A. G. SANDERS,

Jackson, Miss. Professor of French

The *New Republic* regrets its reference to Millsaps College in its report on the Democratic-Dixiecrat struggle in Mississippi. We learn on further checking that the incident occurred, not at Millsaps, but at another institution in Mississippi. We are glad to make this correction and to note that a number of Millsaps faculty members have written us to protest vigorously the slur against the intellectual probity of their college.

—THE EDITORS.

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VOLUME 121, NUMBER 9, ISSUE 1813, NEW YORK CITY, AUGUST 29, 1949 **New Republic**

DOLLAR AND POUND FOR BETTER OR WORSE

GREAT BRITAIN, the home of a great free people, the center of the one international society in the free world, the acknowledged ally and the unacknowledged partner of America for ten hard years, is moving into a major economic crisis. Her gold and dollar reserves, almost exhausted by losses of $260 million in the second quarter of 1949, may fall by $400 million in the third quarter. At this rate, Britain will be bankrupt within a year.

Bold and courageous action by Britain, and broad and generous support by America, alone can save the sterling system. No such action or support is yet in sight. In the Anglo-American-Canadian financial talks that begin this week, an unimaginative agenda will be pored over by unimaginative men. They are embattled and discouraged men on the British delegation; unsympathetic and conservative men on the American side. And they meet under the worst of circumstances. Britain is close to a general election. Our Congress is deadlocked and unwilling to consider any major new program. Conservative American newspapers have been belaboring British socialism in order to defeat the Fair Deal. Conservative British newspapers have given banner headlines to these attacks in order to defeat the Labour Party. These special interests have sown confusion among Americans and created in England a mood of smarting nationalism.

For these reasons there is every chance that the sterling crisis will become a crisis in Anglo-American relations, and that efforts to resolve this crisis will end in breakdown.

The bitterness and recrimination which may follow will not break up the free world. But they may well make impossible the coördinated actions necessary for its preservation.

Too many Americans are indifferent to Britain's problem in the belief that its cause is socialism.

Yet Britain's threatened breakdown is almost entirely unrelated to the nationalization of coal and transportation, the enactment of family allotments and health insurance, and other domestic reforms of the Labour Government. And talk of increasing the productivity of British workers, while very important, is today beside the point. The crisis is not a British crisis but a sterling one. And the immediate cause of the exhaustion of sterling reserves is not in Britain at all. British exports to America have fallen to one half of last year's rate, but this decline accounts for only 15 percent of the fall in the sterling reserves. One half of our total sterling imports consists of rubber and tin from Malaya, jute from India and Pakistan, wool from Australia and New Zealand, and cocoa from the Gold Coast and Nigeria.

The sharp decline in our imports of these goods and in their prices was the initial cause of the crisis. It became almost unmanageable when John Snyder's assurances to American bankers that devaluation of sterling was "in the bag" set off a flight from the pound.

At any time but this, these losses would be within the capacity of the sterling system to absorb. But the system, already weakened, was overtaxed by the commitments made by Britain in the winning of the war. To induce a reluctant India to fight the Axis, Britain undertook to pay the entire cost of the British Army in India and the entire cost of the Indian Army inside and outside India. She paid pro-Axis Egyptian laborers to build the earthworks for Egypt's defense against Rommel. She paid further huge sums to Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. In a cause in which we later accepted an unlimited commitment, Britain gave up the inheritance of centuries of effort and committed herself to sterling debts of $12 billion, a sum which would have taken her labor force, working on exports, 50 years to repay.

The impossibility of repaying these sterling balances in a few years alone made rigid exchange controls and bilateral agreements inevitable in postwar Britain. For Britain has been paying out hard-earned dollars to the Near East, Africa and Asia. South Africa has gone on a terrific buying spree on British dollars. India has drained $720 million from the sterling reserves, more than one half of Britain's ERP aid, partly to finance an armaments race with Pakistan.

The British people have worked far harder than any other nation in Europe to meet their commitments. France and Benelux, the next most successful countries, have raised the ratio of their exports to their imports by 18 percent over prewar levels; Britain's

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ratio of exports to imports has been lifted by 90 percent. But this reflects effort rather than result. Britain's total trade is balanced but her trade with the Dollar Area is desperately unbalanced. The relative unbalance of the pound and the dollar has been made far worse because sterling has been sold by exchange controls at its prewar rate of $4.03, while its parity, in purchasing power, has fallen to little over $3. The result has been to encourage sterling purchases here and to discourage sterling sales.

After World War II a Conservative Government might have attempted to restore the sterling system by classical Tory methods of smashing controls and reducing consumption, by unemployment and lowered living standards. But the British people had another vision: one of lasting full employment and social justice. It meant giving first priority to domestic programs. And, in the sense that these required the continuation of national controls and the raising of domestic living standards, the ambitions of Labour Britain conflicted with the restoration of the sterling system. The conflict was inevitable, but its cost is high.

R. F. Harrod, the British economist, wrote to the London *Times*:

> For three centuries the word sterling has meant a claim which . . . could be converted into gold at a recognized par or . . . bartered . . . in a free and legal exchange market. Sterling now means neither of these things. . . . When one thinks of their [the government's] complete failure to grapple with this problem, words about dissipating and ruining our inheritance do not seem too strong.

Two major and immediate decisions face the British.

The first is devaluation. It is necessary at once in order to encourage sterling exports to America and to discourage sterling purchases here. It is necessary as a long-term solution because until the price levels of the two areas are brought into a sensible relation no common economic system can be organized.

The second necessary step is a settlement of the sterling balances. "Unless we reach a definitive solution of the problems of the balances," Harrod writes, "the sterling area will be broken up within five years."

These two decisions are costly gambles for Britain. The first threatens the living standards of the British people; the second the continuation of the Commonwealth.

The British government is unwilling to act unless we share some measure of the responsibility for these actions. And this, our government is refusing to do.

It argues that devaluation cannot be regarded as a service to America which entitles Britain to support in return, since its purpose is to reduce the market for American exports and to increase Britain's means of competing with American manufacturers.

And—as long as we regard the two nations as competitors and not partners—this narrow and sterile financial viewpoint is logical.

Our government argues further that Britain must take full political responsibility for her necessary and too long deferred decisions; for if on election eve America should seem to force Britain's hand, then this country would be intervening in the election, earning unwarranted resentment, and perhaps unwarranted blame and hatred later on.

And—as long as we regard the two nations as politically unattached—this narrow political approach is also logical, although, by refusing to support any action the Labour Government takes, we are actually intervening on the Conservative side.

There are many ways in which we could support the Sterling Area. We could reduce tariffs, abolish customs regulations, sign commodity agreements guaranteeing the prices and markets of the Commonwealth's raw materials. We could revalue gold and use the $12 billion profits as a new currency stabilization fund. We could finance Britain's purchases of Canadian wheat in ECA dollars and expand the system of financing offshore purchases with dollars under ECA.

The best program which we can offer would be the rapid extension of Point Four from a technical assistance program to a major financial program of economic development. It would be financed by greatly increasing the lending power of the Export-Import Bank through the use of American gold reserves. The Bank would make direct loans, and it would underwrite the profitability and the convertibility of private loans. This program could overcome the world shortage of dollars without additional appropriations; it would offer alternative dollar sources to Britain's creditors and even permit Britain to repay part of the balances as contributions to the development projects.

Yet we are not considering any major long-range action to support Britain. In strictly economic terms, in the view of Congress and the Treasury, it is not worthwhile. It is not worthwhile in any terms as long as our mutual interdependence with the British Commonwealth is not honestly and openly recognized by both sides.

The issue in the coming negotiations is not simply financial. The real problems involved are long-range problems that no short-term solution such as devaluation can solve. The British government recognizes this and if the American government does not it may simply force Britain into a further cycle of economic and po-

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litical nationalism by which her contribution to world stability and world democracy will be diminished. The barrier to further progress in Anglo-American relations is certainly a short-term financial barrier. But it may never be crossed without some vision of what lies beyond.

We need liberation from economic equations, in a bold, long-range approach.

We have long since established a silent but effective union with the British Commonwealth on joint defense. We should now move on to union on the joint management of a banking and currency system. A key currency is a necessary part of the operation of the World Bank and the Monetary Fund, and of expanding world trade. Sterling in the past has played an invaluable role, extending far beyond finance to the economic management of an international society. That role, which unsupported sterling is fast losing, can never be played by the dollar. For America, with its wealth of natural resources and its unique productivity, will never accept the level of imports that the creditor nation of a world system must accept. But America and Britain together, once their currencies are in proper relation to each other, can jointly manage an international sterling-dollar currency that can fulfill sterling's historic role in continued world economic development.

Yet financial union, like military union, is irresponsible unless it is part of a wider system by which peoples are joined. This wider union is a natural step. Our ties to Britain are closer than to any nation, and Britain's ties to us are as real as her ties to the Commonwealth. We have a vital interest in unity. We cannot afford to fall apart. Both sides know this at heart and both should recognize it.

Full recognition of this partnership is not only economically unavoidable, it is politically necessary to provide the inspiration that a new effort requires. The British people feel the need of an ultimate objective; the peoples of the Commonwealth are apparently unwilling to give their system as presently constituted adequate support, and Americans are tired of continued handouts to carry other, separate nations over from one short-term crisis to another in a negative anti-Communist cause.

We are not recommending immediate union. We are advocating an immediate agreement on principle that union is the goal. We see no other clear way beyond the present difficulties. For this seems to be one of those rare moments when timidity can make a passing crisis permanent, while daring can transform it into a new opportunity. If, as we anticipate, the talks fail to reach agreement on limited action, then instead of retreating the governments should advance: they should declare in a joint statement that union is the ultimate aim. They should declare that from now on our common actions will be directed to that end.

THE WEEK

STEEL PREPARES TO SAY NO

It's going to be war in steel. That is the only conclusion to be drawn from the testimony of industry representatives in the first ten days of the hearings before President Truman's Fact Finding Commission in New York City. Day by day, evidence piled up that the companies, calling themselves the spearhead of the anti-inflation army, will defy the decision of the board if it should find that any substantial increase in steel wages and other employee benefits is possible and desirable.

Inland Steel has been somewhat less intransigent than most other companies. It was the only important firm willing to bargain on pensions. Yet listen to the testimony of Clarence B. Randall, its president:

> When the President announced the formation of this board he was in fact announcing an industrial revolution in America. By doing so he has declared himself as favoring a new social order, and one so different from that under which our magnificent production record has been achieved that unless the process is stopped, and stopped at once, there will be no possibility of turning back. This step is always the first one taken by those who set out to establish a socialist or corporative state. The fixing of profits comes next, and then, when incentive is killed and production falls, the final step of nationalization follows. Europe came close to starvation because of this tragic sequence, and was saved only by the dynamic quality of a free America. Yet here is the same pattern. . . .
>
> The bigness which he [President Truman] has here created [in the Fact Finding Board] is a bigness that no three men, gifted though you may be, ought to be asked to assume. It is a bigness that denies every American tradition, and that must be resisted if America is to remain free.
>
> And in my opinion it will be resisted. This is America at the crossroads, and the steel industry cannot stand idly by. . . . The steel industry cannot by its presence here be deemed to consent that this process go on.

And listen further to this statement by Arthur B. Homer, president of the powerful Bethlehem Steel Corporation:

> It is easy to understand why Bethlehem was reluctant on the basis of past experience to give its approval to an irregular procedure which appears to be designed merely as a vehicle for forcing

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upon us important concessions to the union.

Challenged by Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, one of the three members of the board, Homer lamely said that he did not intend to cast any reflection on the members.

Among the other industry spokesmen, man after man testified that steel business is badly down, that companies are operating at or near a loss, that the union demand would cost huge sums, that it would make necessary an increase in the price of steel, that the public would not stand for it, that it would start a new inflation. Typical were the arguments of President Homer: Steel wages are high; they have increased faster than productivity; they have increased faster than the cost of living; except for modest dividends, Bethlehem has put all profits during and since the war into equipment and expansion, and has done the same with $91 million obtained from the sale of securities.

All this must be read in the light of the background facts:

The steelworkers have asked a wage increase of 12.5 cents per hour plus pensions and other types of social insurance, bringing the total cost, according to their calculation, to 30 cents an hour. They buttressed their demand with a report from economist Robert R. Nathan, who said that huge profits will permit the industry to agree to this demand without increasing prices and that building consumer purchasing power is the surest way to head off a depression.

The companies, except Inland, refused to discuss pension demands at all, on the ground that this was forbidden by the old contract. The union thereupon voted to strike, but postponed the date sixty days to September 15, after Truman proposed the Fact Finding Board. The industry at first refused Truman's proposal, and then accepted with utmost reluctance in the face of overwhelming national pressure. If it should repudiate a statement of fact by the board favorable to the union, a strike seems inevitable. It will be a national disaster.

A TOUGHER CLAYTON ACT

For 22 years, the Federal Trade Commission has been urging Congress to eliminate a loophole in the Clayton Anti-Trust Act which, more than almost anything else, has permitted the present heavy concentration of economic power in this country. Before the Clayton Act was passed, most mergers came about through purchases of stock. Since that time, the acquisition of assets not regulated by the Clayton Act has become a much more frequent and popular method of merger.

"This omission," a recent Senate Judiciary Committee report points out, "seems particularly paradoxical, inasmuch as purchases of assets are more binding and lasting, and thus more destructive to competition."

In the 79th and the 80th Congresses, the Judiciary Committees of the House and the Senate approved legislation to plug the loophole, but last week was the first time that a bill on this subject ever reached the floor for a vote. The decisive count of 223-92 by which the House voted to strengthen the Clayton Act to cover transfers of assets proves again that monopoly and trusts are hot issues in this Congress.

Both House and Senate previously had voted more restrictions on the monopolies' use of basing-point price policies. The Senate, overloaded with work, took off three full days last week to debate the basing-point issue still further.

To get an amendment concerning corporate assets on the calendar at all, Representative Celler (D, N. Y.) had to bring it up under the unanimous consent rule, meaning that a two-thirds vote was needed for passage. Thanks primarily to Southerners like Representatives Bryson (D, S. C.), Hobbs (D, Ala.) and Boggs (D, La.), who identified the impersonal issue of merger and concentration with the growing hold of Northern corporations on the life of Southern communities, a more than adequate majority of 71 percent was rolled up for the bill. A lesson for the Administration to draw would seem to be: plunge ahead on anti-trust legislation and regional development, two issues which Southerners have not yet been able to find an excuse for opposing.

THE FREE STATE IS FREER

The Maryland Free State (as Henry Mencken loves to call it) looks much freer this week. The brand new state anti-Communist law, one of the most reckless and dangerous ever passed in this country, has just been declared unconstitutional by a Maryland Circuit Court judge in a magnificent decision which sheds its beams on similar laws in other states and on efforts to pass an anti-subversion act in Congress.

The Maryland law included:

Five years' imprisonment and $5,000 fine for knowingly being a member of a subversive organization.

Twenty years in prison and $20,000 fine for subversive acts.

Loyalty oaths by all public employees, candidates for office and public-school teachers.

Dismissal of employees of the state or its subdivisions on "reasonable grounds . . . to believe that any person is a subversive person."

Judge Joseph Sherbow, Circuit Court of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, declared the law unconstitutional because it violates the basic freedoms of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, due process under the Fifth Amendment, and the Maryland Constitution and Declaration of Rights.

"Law deals with overt acts, not thoughts," said Judge Sherbow. "It may punish for action, not thinking. . . . Laws may not intrude into the realm of ideas, religious and political beliefs and opinions." He also criticized several individual sections of the law for being vague or meaningless, or creating impossible dilemmas for the individual.

The state has said it will appeal Judge Sherbow's decision to Maryland's highest court and, if possible, to the US Supreme Court. But perhaps, on the contrary, Maryland will now come to its senses and live up to its fine, centuries-old tradition of free speech and fair play.

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WHY I VOTED FOR ARMS FOR EUROPE

by Helen Gahagan Douglas

IF THE CHOICE before Congress were one of arms or bread, I would vote for bread. But I do not believe that that is the choice. Guns are no substitute for bread. What we want is to help the peoples of Europe enjoy their bread while they eat it. Our Foreign Affairs Committee recognized that economic recovery is essential to international peace and security and must be given clear priority. But we go further. We recognize that the increased confidence of free peoples in their ability to resist direct or indirect aggression and to maintain internal security will advance such economic recovery as we are making possible through the European Recovery Program and will support political stability.

At the end of the war the first job was to help rebuild those areas which were utterly devastated. That has been done. The fact that we must now take measures to ensure peace is not discouraging. Rather, it is an acceptance of the facts as they are. The need for common defense can be a unifying force. It certainly was a compelling force in the establishment and the growth of the Union of the States which make up our country. Common defense can be a unifying force in Western Europe today.

In working for world peace, past experience must teach us something. The League of Nations failed because it lacked the power to stop aggression. Without an international police force the United Nations is also powerless to maintain peace in the world. There is general agreement on this fact. We have been unable, up to now, despite efforts in that direction, to agree on a general program that would achieve universal control of weapons of mass destruction and universal regulation and reduction of armaments, including armed forces, under adequate safeguards to protect complying nations against violation and evasion. Because we have been unsuccessful in these efforts we, therefore, have not been able as yet to set up under the United Nations an international police to enforce the peace.

The Foreign Affairs Committee believes, and so states in the MAP bill, that we should continue to seek for agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated in the charter, and to seek for agreements to achieve universal control and reduction of weapons of mass destruction.

In the meantime, we can sit idly by, ignoring the potential threat of Russia, or take positive action to maintain order in the world.

This is a program to implement collective security. It is not an aggressive program, but a program of defense—a program that can be a pilot plant for a future world police force.

I believe that the proposed Military Aid Program fits into the positive pattern of our principal actions for world peace. We have made this clear in the "findings and declaration of policy" which precede the substantive titles of the House bill. We announce not only to the American people but also to the rest of the world that the Congress of the United States reaffirms the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations.

Mutuality of security, which is the basis of our belief in the need for an international police force, is the premise also of the North Atlantic Treaty, which has been ratified by the Senate of the United States. I say this is a step forward. We took no such positive action after World War I, with the result that there was World War II. Under the United Nations we are permitted to act in self-defense; we are permitted to join organizations to act in self-defense.

No one can consider this military-aid bill, under any condition, an aggressive action. We are not increasing the armed forces of Europe. We are simply permitting those armed forces which they now have to become properly equipped, so that they can ward off an attack, if it comes, or ward it off long enough to permit us to come to their aid.

I do not think anybody in our committee believes that Russia is going to war tomorrow. I myself do not think so. But the fact remains that the Soviet Union through its foreign policy has done its utmost in the last four years to prevent European recovery and by its maintenance of one of the largest peacetime armies in history has deliberately created an atmosphere of fear and danger.

It has been the shadow of this great army hanging over Europe which made necessary the Atlantic Treaty and has prompted the nations of Western Europe to ask for military assistance. We know what happened in Czechoslovakia because of the shadow of that army.

We know what has happened in the countries which have gone behind the Iron Curtain and have come under the influence of Russia. We know that the world Communist movement does exist. If the people in France, say, or the people in Italy feel that they have not enough arms to protect themselves against a sudden uprising such as there was in Czechoslovakia, with the weight and shadow of this great army in Russia, they would not resist. Russia then, without moving her soldiers, could take over those countries one by one, using the same kind of tactics

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that it has used in the last three or four years.

The Military Aid Program is a war deterrent. We must help restore a sense of security to free nations by increasing their own ability and morale necessary to discourage aggression and maintain their independence. This assistance, added to our other forms of aid, can create the conditions of strength and stability without which the UN cannot function.

American economic aid to Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty and now the Military Assistance Program have built up a momentum of confidence in Western Europe and a new determination to remain free. Those peoples now believe that with the assistance we are considering, they can make themselves secure against any aggression or a great war. They believe, or are beginning to believe, that a third world war can be prevented from starting in their area. They have set out on a path and they expect to continue along that path. If the military aid they have requested from the United States is given now, it will be given at the timely, the psychological moment when it can add most to the rising momentum toward a self-respecting peace for Western Europe and the free world.

It is not enough to hate war. We must love peace with a zeal and passion greater than our hate for war. I for one am willing to take what some members of the House have called the risks in this program. To do nothing is to sow the seeds of war. The plain facts of history demonstrate that. It is far wiser to take risks that can create the conditions for peace than to take the do-nothing risks that can create the conditions for war.

If the program is worth doing, if the program is valid, then it seems to me we must take the advice of our Chiefs of Staff as to what it will cost. I cannot pit my knowledge against General Bradley, and I cannot accept the judgment of members of Congress who recommend a much smaller program than that of General Bradley. General Bradley has testified that the $1.45 billion program requested is the minimum that will work. It is to be hoped that the Senate approves it in full. Since I think this is a necessary program, since I think it contributes to peace, I for one am not going to wreck the program by buying it at the bargain counter.

OUTSIDE AMERICA

LONDON

Strasbourg as seen here, in the perspective of London's long experience over the centuries with efforts to unify Europe, seems in certain important ways to represent a beginning of some form of Western European comity. The meeting of the Council of Europe, now going on in a city perhaps more than any other laden with the memories of old European conflicts, may turn out to be as important as the UN charter conference. What will be done (or left undone) during the next few weeks by the statesmen gathered on the Rhine may eventually express itself in a concrete political entity, in a grouping and fusion of new sovereignties borrowed from the old national sovereignties, pooled for a common Continental good and perhaps deserving the name of a United States of Europe.

Yet President Spaak of the new Consultative Assembly seemed, from here, to be going too far and not quite in the right direction when he said at Strasbourg that "The real division is between those who really believe in European unity and those who do not." There was even more doubt about the soundness of Spaak's remark that "New and wider loyalties are emerging in Strasbourg." These doubts do not come from men lacking an intense desire to see Europe unified. On the contrary, they come from "good Europeans" who, however, are as much concerned with practical difficulties as with idealistic intentions, and who fear that the wrong means may hurt the right end.

Strasbourg is a start, but by no means *the* start, on the road to Western European unity, and it would be disastrous for the men of the Council of Europe to try to deny or circumvent the problems already brought up by the previous beginnings. What is most important is not the newness or the width of the new loyalties that may be emerging in Strasbourg; what counts is their dependability, their power to resist the tugs of old and narrow loyalties. If the new European is to be loyal to a United States of Europe, he must feel that the international state fulfills, or at least does not deny, the political ideals for which he worked when he was merely a citizen of a national state.

Strasbourg's value is that of a catalyst rather than that of a solvent of those political conflicts which not only divide Europe but also every Western European nation. If the black and white of the Cold War can be replaced by a multicolored political spectrum, that will be progress—for Europe and for every Western European nation.

Spaak and many others at Strasbourg attach great importance to the problem of the relations between the Council's Committee of Ministers and its Consultative Assembly. This indeed is the crux of the technical issues the statesmen must face, for the members of the Assembly speak for the Western Europe of tomorrow while the ministers—men actually holding power in national states—speak for the Western Europe as it is today.

Winston Churchill, a Tory, is in the Assembly; but the common goal of unifying Europe which he shares with Ernest Bevin and Herbert Morrison does not alter the fact that they are Labourites with a very different view of the United States of Europe that is forming. Thus behind the technical problem is a major political one. When Churchill demands greater independence from the ministers than

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the Assembly is given by the Statute of the Council of Europe, he is also working for *his* kind of political unity of Europe.

One of Churchill's aims is to get the problem of Germany on the agenda of the Strasbourg meeting. Since there is nothing in the statute authorizing the Assembly to discuss Germany (even less the admission of Germany to the Council), the ministers must give their permission. Not only Bevin, but French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, believes that it is too soon to take up Germany. Thus, existing differences of policy on existing political problems also stand in the way of agreeing on the future; men in power in Western European capitals refuse to have men out of power invoke the United States of Europe to make them change their present policies. Even if a compromise is reached at Strasbourg on Germany, the point stands.

There are stumbling blocks in the way of creating a United States of Europe other than insistence on unyielding national sovereignty; not the least of them is insistence by the men in power in the various nations on making policy in consonance with the wishes of their national parliaments rather than the putative parliament of Strasbourg. On the other hand—and this is a virtue of Strasbourg—the debate in the "all-Western Europe" Assembly on a subject such as Germany may help the members of the various national parliamentary assemblies toward a revision of prejudices parading as principles. The potential United States of Europe may make the existing Western Europe less disunited (or at least more reasonably and realistically divided).

Thus far the pro-Socialist members of the Strasbourg Assembly have done nothing concrete to form a bloc, perhaps because they constitute a minority. Yet they already tend to form a fairly compact group on at least one major issue, also brought to the fore by Churchill. He put at the head of the list of subjects he suggested for the agenda "consideration of any necessary changes in the political structure of Europe" in order to facilitate the movement toward unity. Behind this innocent-seeming phrase is the same basic conflict of orientation that has been emerging during the last few months and which had become plain during the meeting in Paris in May of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The conflict is between those who believe that true economic reorganization of Europe is impossible without political and military reorganization and those who, on the other hand, believe that joint economic planning must *precede* political and military reorganization.

Naturally, the problem of Germany is the heart of the matter. The election in Germany this week (and even more the election campaigns) showed that the Germans are swinging toward the political Right; the Socialists outdid the conservatives in their nationalism. Churchill's "necessary changes in the political structure of Europe" would probably give a large role to the new nationalistic Western Germany. This would serve the purposes of those men at Strasbourg who agree with conservatives here in London that *military* reorganization of Western Europe should come first; who believe that no strategic plan can make Western Europe defensible without rearming the Germans—especially the nationalistic Germans. Those who argue in favor of economic precedence believe that such a course would be fatal to the eventual unification of Western Europe, that no United States of Europe accepting armed German nationalism—no matter what the justification—is politically possible.

While Churchill argues in favor of Germany in Strasbourg, the Labour Government here in London believes that any step toward letting the Germans cover their essential import requirements by exports would impair, perhaps cripple, Britain's present recovery drive.

Churchill, Labourites say, is out of power, and can afford to take such risks; in his drive to regain political power in England (of which his attitudes at Strasbourg are part) he is entirely unscrupulous. The Labour positon is that careful joint economic planning, of Britain with Germany, and of Britain and Germany with all the other Western European countries, must come first. Their point is that the United States of Europe is impossible unless the old German political nationalism is *not* revived and unless the new Western European economic nationalisms are broken down.

The Strasbourg Assembly is an excellent place to discuss such matters fully and frankly. Many English liberals believe Germany should be admitted to the Council, if only to make such discussion possible. To this extent (and no further) they agree with Churchill. For despite Schuman's objections, there are many currents in France in favor of Franco-German understanding. Industrialists and bankers would like to revive the international cartels that linked Nazi Germany's business with French big business. These Frenchmen are putting economics first, and in a way to frighten English progressives.



For a while last winter and early spring, it appeared that the Fair Dealers in Washington had won their point that economics, rather than politics and military strategy, should be given precedence in Germany (and in Europe generally); and that the spearhead of the Western drive in Germany should be against cartelism and old-fashioned nationalism. Later this spring and early summer, the trend was reversed; the soldiers and sailors had their way, and nationalism in Germany was allowed to ride back to power on the wave of anti-Sovietism at any cost and at any price.

Strasbourg this month will tell what next autumn and winter hold for Germany and Europe. The debates on the United States of Europe of tomorrow will suggest (and influence) the next steps for the disunited Europe of today.

PERCY WINNER

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LEFT OF CENTER

"Wanted—an ideology." That's the ad a number of the more far-sighted labor leaders would now be posting if they dared publicize their deepest concern. Labor's growth in the US has coincided with a period of rising prices in the course of which unions could offer ever higher monetary wages. In a forthcoming period of possible price decline—and even increased unemployment—union ranks need the power of ideas to hold them together and keep them active.

The United Auto Workers (CIO), in its magazine *Ammunition* (devoted to training local leadership), is starting an interesting series entitled "Ideas Come to a Head." The purpose is to provide UAW members with a broad cultural background derived (in the first issue) from the Bible, Jefferson, Lincoln, Marx, Veblen, Keynes, Freud and Beveridge. The point of departure is the immediate problem of the UAW activists; the point of arrival is the place of the union—as an idea—in the great flow of mighty ideas.

From Jefferson, for instance, is culled the concept of the age-old struggle between social groups. Though this is close to Marxism, the UAW rejects the theory of increasing misery and of violent revolution. Veblen is credited with predicting the breakdown of the price system, namely, the great depression that so profoundly affected the early history of the CIO. Freud is translated into shop terms—the union negotiator taking advantage of "slips of the tongue," workers understanding the theory of the "scapegoat" when they are abused because the supervisor abused the foreman, shop stewards suffering the woes of the Oedipus entanglement when they must become father confessors to the whole shop.

For the second summer, the School for Workers at the University of Wisconsin—at the insistence of the AFL Garment Workers in its two-week institute—has given a compulsory course entitled "Ideas That Move Mankind," a wrestling with the ethical and political motives of antiquity and modernity.

When Philip Murray began to outline a plan of over-all social organization built around labor-management shop councils, the Communists attacked it with the fervor especially reserved for a competing ideology.

Civil liberties is still one of the most confused and confusing issues. James Kutcher, legless veteran removed from his job because of Trotskyite affiliation, appealed for support at Local 10, International Longshoremen (CIO), the home local of Harry Bridges, himself under fire. Kutcher was opposed by elements described as Stalinist in the Trotskyite *Militant.* With Bridges present as a bystander, the membership voted to back Kutcher. . . . In the National Maritime Union, a referendum to bar "subversives" was dropped because of voting irregularities. The matter goes to a convention in September. . . . The AFL's *League Reporter* editorially takes issue with those who pooh-pooh the danger of Communism, and stresses the need to fear the Communists—intelligently. In the adjoining column, as if to pluck the barb, the AFL paper reprints Henry Steele Commager's piece from the New York *Times* on the dangers of hysteria against unpopular causes.

The National Conference of Union Labor Veterans (break-away from the American Legion with membership from 51 international unions in 37 cities) moves leftward with resolutions for public housing, repeal of Taft-Hartley, expanded social security, FEPC, anti-discrimination, etc. It opens its doors to non-unionists and bars Communists and Fascists.

The Townsendites have gone on record for a Third Party. . . . The American Labor Party in New York City will see its first serious primary since the Liberal Party split-away if and when Eugene Connelly contests the position of Borough President with Ewart Guinier. . . . The school in search of a campus (the faculty and students of Olivet College) is unable to use the site of Madison Barracks to set up the projected Shipherd College with Alvin Johnson as head because the New York Board of Regents insists on a capitalization of $500,000—which the school does *not* have. . . . Joaquin Marin, a leader of the once famous Spanish POUM, after ten years in Franco's jails is now in the US. In an article in the *New Leader*, he argues that the longer Franco is in power the more likely is he to be followed by a Communist government.

How to unite AFL, CIO, Railway Brotherhoods, independent unions, and liberal organizations like ADA in an effective political agency is the documented theme of a booklet issued by the United Labor Committee, the Massachusetts group that successfully led the 1948 campaign to defeat the anti-labor amendments. The illustrated booklet can be obtained for 25 cents from 90 Beacon Street, Boston.

In Crawford County, Pennsylvania, the AFL and the CIO are setting up a campaign for 1950 to reach right down to the block unit. In Meadville, committees of LLPE and PAC met to assign workers on a house-to-house basis.

The two largest of the new veterans' organizations, the AVC and the AMVETS, are moving toward merger this September. Harold Russell (hero of "Best Years of Our Lives"), who has been touring the country making anti-discrimination talks, is a likely candidate for the next AMVETS commander.

George Orwell, author of *Nineteen Eighty-Four,* insists that his satire is not an attack upon either the British Labour Party (of which he is a member) or Socialism. The book, he says, is "a show-up of the perversions to which a centralized economy is liable and which have already been partly realized in Communism and Fascism."

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THE UN JUGGLES THE ATOM

by Homer Metz

WITH THE ATOM BOMB in danger of becoming another football of American domestic politics, the once bright hope that the uses of atomic energy for military purposes could be controlled internationally grows dimmer and dimmer. The pessimists at the United Nations now think it may be another 20 years before a system of international control can be agreed upon and established.

Meanwhile, the world faces the prospect of an atomic arms race with possible awesome results. As long as there is no international control system, the Soviet Union will use every resource it possesses to discover "the secret" of the weapon. (American experts say there is no single secret, only a number of technical devices, and that the Russians almost certainly will know enough to produce at least a few bombs within two or three years.) In the meantime, as long as there is no international control system the United States will continue to make bombs, and make them more powerful. Self-preservation is the first law of nations just as it is of men.

The only long-range guarantee of world peace is the control of the bomb by an international authority so strong that no nation or combination of nations can misuse it. Since January, 1946, the UN has sought with a grim sense of urgency to establish such an authority, only to experience one failure after another.

Why this record of futility with a problem of such transcendental importance? The answer is to be found chiefly in the obscure motives of Soviet intransigence and, to a lesser degree, in the suspicions which becloud most American eyes whenever they turn eastward.

The UN's efforts began shortly after the opening of the first session of the General Assembly in London when a resolution was adopted establishing the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The Commission comprises all members of the Security Council, the "Big Five" permanently and the others temporarily, plus Canada, which was given a permanent seat because of its contributions to the development of the atomic bomb and its natural resources in fissionable elements.

At the Commission's very first meeting, in June of 1946, the US representative, Bernard M. Baruch, presented a working plan, which, in its essentials, has come to be regarded as the only satisfactory blueprint for international-control machinery by all nations which have served on the AEC—except the Soviet Union and its satellites.

This "Baruch Plan" was drawn from a report made to Dean Acheson, then Assistant Secretary of State, by a group of experts headed by David E. Lilienthal, now head of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, and it is based on the premise that the very nature of atomic power demands that its control by an international authority must be foolproof and not subject in any way to national rivalries.

In a speech at Hunter College in the Bronx, Baruch told the UN AEC that an international board should assume control of *all* activities involving the production and use of atomic energy. No government, no private interests, he said, should have the right to produce atomic energy for either peaceful or military purposes. And no government should have the right to veto any of the control authority's decisions. In short, the atom and its fearful power must be internationalized.

Only in this way, asserted Baruch, could the grave risks inherent in the use of atomic power be eliminated and the future of civilization assured. There can be no questions of national sovereignty, group interests or limited objectives.

In addition to outlawing a general veto, the American plan, as presented by Baruch, specifically banned a veto on punishment of a nation found to be violating the convention from which the control authority would derive its power. To some extent, this latter provision may seem academic, since a major violation would probably mean war, but the framers of the plan felt it was necessary to make the control board's "paper," or legal, authority iron-clad.

The American plan also suggested (a) international control over every phase of atomic production, including the mining of uranium, thorium and other fissionable materials; (b) the operation and management by the international authority of all dangerous phases in the production of the nuclear fuel from which atomic weapons can be fashioned; (c) a system of periodic international inspection which would prevent clandestine production or research; (d) retention by the United States of its atomic bombs, plants and "know-how" until it became certain that the control plan was

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in effective operation, and (e) a step-by-step program whereby nations party to the plan would turn over their information and resources to the international authority.

To elaborate a bit on this last point: the nations first would disclose the location and extent of their deposits of fissionable materials, and then proceed, stage by stage, through the various processes involved in the manufacture of nuclear fuel, until at the very last stage the United States would turn over to the international authority the carefully guarded technique of the firing mechanism of the atomic bomb.

On the whole, the American plan was as ingenious as expert human thinking could make it, and preeminently fair, since, in its long-range implications at least, it represented a generosity and idealism by the United States such as no other nation in history has ever displayed. This was readily recognized by most of the nations—with the exception of the Soviet Union and its satellite powers.

With a few modifications—notably one offered by France—the American plan has been accepted by an overwhelming majority of every UN Atomic Energy Commission which has sat since 1946, and at Paris last fall the General Assembly endorsed it, with only the six Soviet-bloc states voting in opposition.

The French modification specifies that the amount of atomic production to be allowed each country should be determined in advance in the convention establishing the control agency, rather than left to be decided later by the agency itself. Why this was accepted is easily understood. The French proposal provides a safeguard against the possibility that a combination of interests within the control authority would allot an unduly large number of plants to one country and deny to another its fair share.

Four days after Baruch offered the UN AEC the American plan, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko asserted that it was "totally inacceptable" to his government. Since that day Russian opposition has given way on a few minor points here and there, but the basic premises of the plan still are "totally inacceptable."

In the months of intermittent debate which have followed, Gromyko and other Soviet spokesmen have steadfastly charged that the control plan proposed by the United States is nothing more than an ill-concealed plot to establish a worldwide atomic monopoly and to destroy the sovereignty of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet charges are manifestly absurd. Even if it wished, the United States could hardly gain a worldwide atomic monopoly under the type of international control envisaged in its plan. Ownership and management of the raw materials of atomic power by an international agency would prevent any nation from obtaining use of more of these materials than it would require for peaceful purposes, and in this the United States could not logically demand a proportionately larger share than the Soviet Union.

It is true that denial of the veto right and a system of strict international inspection would demand the surrender by the Soviet Union of some degree of what might be called "sovereignty," but the surrender on its part would be no greater than that of the other powers party to the control convention. Moreover, the use of atomic power is already a reality in the United States. In the Soviet Union it is still, as far as we know, in the future. In surrendering its bombs and its secrets the United States would perforce give up much more of its so-called sovereignty than the Soviet Union would in permitting a board of international inspectors, on which it would undoubtedly be fairly represented, the right to move unrestricted through its territory.

In the main, Gromyko and his successor on the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission, Jacob A. Malik, have chosen to ignore these arguments, challenging the United States to prove its good faith by agreeing to destroy its stockpile of atomic bombs before international-control machinery is established.

While this challenge admittedly is somewhat effective as propaganda, it does not bear up under analysis. In a world where power remains the ultimate arbiter, why should the United States surrender its claim on the greatest instrument of power yet devised until it is absolutely certain that possession of this power by others will not be abused? In a lawless community, it is unreasonable to demand that citizens give up their guns before a police force has been set up.

However, it must be conceded that the Western Powers in general and the United States in particular have not done all they could to allay the suspicions which undoubtedly contribute largely to the Soviet position. The United States, for example, could perhaps have offered to destroy a portion of its bomb stockpile before international control became effective without endangering its national security. On the contrary, the publicity value of such a gesture to the basic principles of the American control plan might have offset the intrinsic loss occasioned by the loss of the bomb.

In any event, the Soviet Union appears no closer to acceptance of the control plan approved by the vast majority of United Nations members than it was in the beginning. Instead, Gromyko and Malik want the Atomic Energy Commission to adopt a counter plan drawn up in the Kremlin.

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What does this counter plan offer? Its basic provisions can be said to be as follows: (a) the atomic bomb would be outlawed by simple convention; (b) all stockpiles of bombs would be destroyed "simultaneously" with the signing of the convention outlawing them; (c) an international-control agency would be established and no veto power would be permitted in it, *but* the control board would be an appendage of the Security Council, not a distinct entity as envisaged in the American program, and the veto would continue to prevail; (d) control over atomic-energy developments would be left to individual countries; (e) a limited, not an unrestricted, system of inspection would be allowed, and (f) the control agency would not be permitted to control the sources of fissionable raw materials, nor would it be allowed to operate any atomic plants.

To the Western powers, the Soviet plan offers no guarantee of security at all, no assurance that an atomic arms race would not continue. In fact, they regard it as fundamentally worthless.

Thus the deadlock over the international control of atomic energy continues. Last fall in Paris, the General Assembly "ordered" the Atomic Commission to seek a way out of the impasse, but after a few months of desultory efforts this year it gave up the fight. At Lake Success recently it adopted a resolution suspending its sessions indefinitely.

In so doing, the Atomic Commission has formally thrown the issue into the laps of the five Great Powers, plus Canada, where it has been in fact, if not in theory, from the very beginning. The Big Six, if they can be so called, are also under "orders" from the General Assembly; they have been asked to determine "if a basis for agreement exists." The aim and effect of this has been to put the atomic negotiations on a "higher level" than they have been heretofore.

Representatives of the six powers are now holding periodic meetings at Lake Success, but the fundamental issues remain unchanged. There is no reason to believe their chances of reaching an agreement are any brighter than those of the Commission.

FOUR ABSOLUTE MONARCHS

by Charles G. Bolte

VIENNA

IN VIENNA there are two topics of political conversation: the treaty and the occupation. The advent of the first is eagerly awaited, if only because it will be followed by the end of the second. The most optimistic informed opinion is that the treaty may be signed by the foreign ministers in October, ratified by January, and put into effect by April—when the troops will leave. What happens then worries many Americans but not many Austrians, for whom the end of the occupation gleams so rosily as to blur the jagged outlines of the passage ahead. One Austrian said: "There's no talk about world government here; our experience of international government so far is not encouraging."

The bitterness of the Austrians springs from the Moscow Declaration of the foreign ministers, which told them that they would be treated as a liberated people. This was a delightful present to the majority of Austrians, who had welcomed the *anschluss* and behaved as much like good Nazis as it is possible for the majority of Austrians to behave (somewhere a cut above the Italians, but well below the Bavarians). They showed their hostility to the Nazis and their determination to "work their passage home," as the phrase went, by standing sensibly aside while the Red Army threw the SS troops out of Vienna unassisted.

The Moscow Declaration was, in common with other ventures of war, a calculated risk in which the prize was valuable enough to justify the chance of loss: the amount of the loss can be gauged by the number of times one is requested, plaintively, to explain why Austria was occupied at all—"We were the first country occupied by the Nazis," and so on. One Austrian added, "We came to a republic from an absolute monarchy, and now we are ruled by four absolute monarchs each wanting different things."

The Austrian estimate of what the four monarchs want is suggested by a favorite story of last winter, when the snow failed to come and the tourist business was ruined. Finally, the story goes, it snowed, the skiing bulletins flashed out, and an Austrian newspaper asked the four powers for statements to be used for drumming up more trade. The British said they could not comment until they had heard from Whitehall. The Americans said it was a gift from the Marshall Plan. The Russians said it was capitalistic snow, and anyone who skied on it would be damned eternally.

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The French said nothing, but loaded all the snow on flat-cars and took it to France.

A group of touring Americans met with a group of Austrians for a discussion on the treaty the other day, but the topic was switched at the outset by the Austrian chairman, who proposed that it be discussed under two question-headings: "First, are the Americans aware of what it means to live for four years as a so-called liberated country under four occupying powers? Second, what comes after the treaty? America is using her economic power nobly in the Marshall Plan, but what can she offer us in the ideological and spiritual sphere?" One American tried to finish off the first question by replying at once, "No, of course not. We've never done it," but the Austrians kept returning to the point. One, a teacher, said that the youth were becoming disillusioned with democracy: they saw the behavior of the foreign soldiers and the disagreements among the Allies, and asked their teachers what was good about democracy. A recent questionnaire, he said, showed that 50 percent of the workers blamed Austria's troubles on the occupation. (More Austrians are employed than ever before, and industrial recovery is proceeding at a good rate, but here as elsewhere in Europe real wages have declined.)

Another Austrian, a professor of law, said there were "too many soldiers here, and not only soldiers but more and more officers," a complaint in which all soldiers would doubtless join. He said the occupation could not teach democracy to Austria, and indeed that it did not have to: "We know democracy from the time of Franz Joseph—he had a democratic monarchy. When we older men who remember democracy die, I don't know who will teach it to the youth. It is a matter of ten years, perhaps ten months." Luckily there was a Frenchman there who courteously but firmly described the political system of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, adding, "You are a liberated country, I agree. But we have just come from Germany, and if we believed everything we heard we'd have to call them liberated, too."

Another Austrian, a bank-manager, perhaps sensing the anger of the Americans at appearing to be blamed for the prolongation of the occupation, said, "We know the difference in the occupation troops; we don't criticize the Americans but the system. The people are restless now because they are better fed. They feel a sniff of liberty and want more. We only appeal to the Americans—get the treaty through and give Austria a chance. The evidence of the past years shows that Austria is ready to govern herself."

The Americans, for their theme, recurred constantly to the question: "Aren't you afraid of the Russians if we leave?" The question was asked in a variety of ways, and evaded in as many. One American said, "We've spent three-quarters of a billion dollars of taxpayers' money in order to help you resist Communism. That's a big expenditure we're making for democracy." Another said, "We want a little more guidance from you on what our policy should be. We're powerful, we've got the atomic bomb, we'll use it if we have to, but we want your ideas on our policy."

These demonstrations of American frankness were met only by the sound of the stiffening of backs all over the room. One Austrian finally asked: "If you're so sure the Russians won't keep the treaty, why do you negotiate with them?" Another Austrian, after several more American attempts to elicit statements indicating fear of the Russians, burst out, "You are asking us questions we cannot answer. We don't know if the Russians will keep the treaty—they are *your* allies, not ours." He was in deadly earnest, but in the wave of laughter which arose the topic was dropped.

An Austrian Socialist newspaper editor, so intelligent and so honest that one's heart warmed to the human race again, answered privately the Russian question which his compatriots had sensibly evaded in public. "I think they decided in 1945 that they couldn't have Austria," he said, "and I think they will stick by that decision. There is nothing for us to fear in the withdrawal of the troops—they know they can't come back without having war with you. The Tito business means that the danger of border incidents is eliminated. The Austrian Communists are inconsequential—five percent only in the last election. The memory of the Russian occupation guarantees against their gaining much strength. When those people at the seminar criticized the occupation, they were only criticizing the Russians, you know. We have learned to convey our meaning to one another without using certain words. But it is sometimes difficult for visitors to understand."

His hope for the future, and the hope of his party, was for an Austria neutral in the military sense. "Not neutral," he added, "as between democracy and dictatorship, freedom and its reverse." Austria's first act after the occupation, he thought, would be to apply for admission to the United Nations—not because any Austrian puts any faith in it as a means of keeping the peace, but "as a symbol of the restoration of Austria's sovereignty." Then she will apply, he thought, for admission to the European Union, whose political and economic benefits are evidently to be sought in the hope that they will not be overburdened by an onerous military commitment.

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He guessed that "a new sense of Europeanness" was developing, in spite of old and new obstacles, chiefly because Europe has come to be regarded as a necessity in the world today. He was not clear about the "mission of Europe" in the world, but was sure that a closer European union was essential to the survival of the small nations. "All of them know they can do nothing alone," he said. "They start by saying, '*They* must do something'—meaning America; then they say, when they begin to understand, '*We* must do something.' That is the hope."

The guide at the Schönbrunn Palace longed for the days of Franz Joseph. He was reserved about Metternich —too much censorship and no foreign travel permitted —and felt none of the nostalgia for him that some of the Germans we met felt for Bismarck. He was emphatic that the Austrians were quite different from the Germans and would never wish to be joined to Germany again (the Socialist editor agreed); he was equally emphatic that the Austrian Socialists were not at all different from the Communists. (The Socialist editor nodded sadly when I told him, and said: "It's the only campaign slogan the People's Party have. Nobody could be more anti-Communist than we are, but it's no use saying so.") The guide thought that democracy was not doing so well. "Things were better under Franz Joseph," he said, "and in the first Hitler years. Hitler was all right until the war. We had good jobs and good pay."

One of the American occupation officials snorted over his whisky. "Here we are, in one of the great cities of the world, with operas, trolley-cars, theatres, museums; and what do we do? We run our own bus-service, sell cokes in the Clam Gallas Palace, and organize bingo games. Some of the soldiers make their beds and then play baseball for the rest of the day—they are excused duty so they can entertain the other troops. There are, maybe, 150 occupational personnel who are operational, who do the work of the occupation, and know what it's about; and they're supported on this monstrous pyramid of seven or eight thousand people, who do nothing but run the machine. We certainly don't need their help at all." His friends agreed with him.

They seemed to feel walled off from the Austrians by the curtain of American habits and the artifacts the occupation had brought with it, and walled off from the people back home by that extraordinary news curtain, or news sieve, of today, through which penetrate only those facts which fit the pattern. "I told ——," one of them said, naming a famous correspondent, "that there was complete freedom of political organization in the Soviet zone. He said, 'You can't print that in America.' It didn't fit the pattern, you see. Just like those Americans at the seminar the other day, amazed to learn, apparently, that Austria had a federal government of Austrians governing the whole country and wasn't split up into separate provinces by the occupiers as Germany is."

The American chairman of the seminar had said, by way of introduction, "The United States has come into the exercise of great power. The question is, will it be used intelligently and with good-will? The latter is assured, I think. But we still need a great deal of education, people-to-people."

THE MIDDLE CLASS NEEDS HOUSES TOO

by Catherine Bauer

PASSAGE OF THE Housing Act of 1949 is a major victory for the Administration and the American people. It was also a major defeat for the real-estate lobby, whose ignoble hysteria probably weakened the well-organized and very well-oiled campaign against the bill. (In their Washington letter of June 30, the National Association of Home Builders blamed Dewey and Taft more than Truman and the Democrats for this triumph of "socialization"!)

The long fight for effective housing legislation would be worth some real political analysis. Why, for instance, has housing reform remained such a bitterly anti-Administration issue in the House, while it has long been so thoroughly bipartisan in the Senate? The popular line-up is also interesting. Collaborating actively with the National Housing Conference were all the national labor, veteran, religious, welfare and civic organizations, almost without exception. Local governments were solidly behind the bill, and several slum-conscious City Councils even voted contributions to the National Housing Conference. Funds for the campaign, meager though they were, dribbled in from all over the country, rather more from the South than from big Northern cities or powerful national organizations.

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The Dixiecrats in the House, who almost defeated the bill by voting with their Republican friends at the last minute, may well turn out to have made a big mistake.

On the other side were the National Association of Real Estate Boards, the National Association of Home Builders and the US Savings and Loan League, backed up by their friends in the Producers' Council and the US Chamber of Commerce. In its die-hard strategy, moreover, the real-estate lobby did not even represent fairly the views of its own constituents. Many local real-estate boards are on record in favor of a limited public-housing program, and the principle of federal aid for slum clearance and redevelopment is widely accepted by property interests.

This was therefore a victory for a new kind of line-up of some potential significance, which might be called a "consumer civic-welfare coalition." In the past there was always some other angle to housing legislation: employment in the 1930's, war-production efficiency in the early forties. But in the postwar period, housing has been a straight consumer issue, a question of family and community welfare pure and simple. And the political weakness of the consumer in America has been reëmphasized by the recent history of price-controls, etc. This time, however, the consumers finally won.

The five-year controversy was itself a big factor. A great resounding nationwide row may be a pretty crude form of "adult education," blurred by the smoke of propaganda and distorted by the heat of embattled political emotion. But there is no more effective instrument for speedy popular enlightenment on the ins and outs of a complicated question of public policy. The basic facts *do* come out in the open, one way or another. So we can probably thank the real-estate lobby for the fact that the American people, including their Senators and Representatives, have learned a great deal about housing in the past few years.

But we'll need all this public enlightenment and a lot more besides if the next two steps in housing policy and civic planning are to be accomplished successfully.

Question No. 1: *Administration of the new program.* The Housing Act merely provides a good set of tools for rehousing slum dwellers, for the improvement and replacement of decrepit farm homes, for much needed research, and for the clearance and redevelopment of blighted areas. The operating initiative and responsibility for this program is entirely local, but the framework of purpose and policy must nevertheless be shaped at the federal level, by the Housing and Home Finance Agency and its constituent, the Public Housing Administration. These are pretty weak agencies at the present moment. Almost everyone who spoke at the Washington housing convention last May made some pointed allusion to the inadequacy of the present top administrative setup for such vast new responsibilities.

The PHA was unfortunately the particular butt of the 79th and 80th Congresses. Most of its able and experienced personnel were lost, and with few exceptions an atmosphere of shell-shock, fear and demoralization still pervades the offices in the Longfellow Building. It was not their fault, but unless fresh zeal is rapidly developed and energetic new blood injected at all levels, the dead hand of a timid and tired bureaucracy will dull and delay and frustrate the great creative possibilities of the new public-housing program.

The HHFA is also, by and large, a timid, stodgy and unimaginative agency. Its Administrator, always considered a "safe FHA man" by the real-estate lobby (which publicly consoles itself with this thought), contributed very little to the development or defense of the program which he is now responsible for carrying out. The revitalization of the PHA and the establishment of entirely new agencies and policies to handle urban redevelopment and research (perhaps coöperatives, as well, in the near future) will be a major test of his social ideals and administrative acumen.

But the real and ultimate responsibility for this program is at the grass-roots level, all the more so if dynamic leadership from Washington is lacking. The quality of the results depends on the quality of the local housing authorities, planning commissions and redevelopment agencies that will devise the plans and programs, buy the land, negotiate for its future use, and build and manage the low-rent housing. But the issues involved are very literally "close to home": that's why they're both complicated and controversial. And even if a city hires the best experts available, they won't get very far without well-organized and well-informed citizen support behind them.

Here are a few of the issues:

In the first place, the public-housing program is five times as large as that started under the US Housing Act before the war, and the results will have no small effect on urban environment and community life. But housing projects, however "decent, safe and sanitary" in accord with the law, can be dull and dreary, ugly, unsuited to family life, badly located, and managed with officious paternalism. And tenant selection, without citizen vigilance, can acquire a "political" tinge.

The problem of designing "large-scale housing" so that it is humane and attractive as well as efficient has

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by no means been solved, whether by public, institutional or speculative builders. What is needed is a free and experimental attitude, the most imaginative architectural and managerial talent available, *and* the kind of popular interest and concern that can mow down obsolete building codes, stupid zoning restrictions, too rigid "minimum standards" handed out from Washington, and bureaucratic or political opportunism. Above all, perhaps, we must dispense with the notion that housing for poor people should look the part and maintain a sort of "charity" atmosphere. Here is one field at least where a little Utopianism, however unfashionable, could be used to great advantage.

Then there is the fact that federal subsidies for "redevelopment" require the preparation of over-all local land-use plans, which means that every city and metropolitan district will have to make some profound and far-reaching decisions, for better or worse. Vast urban areas have been completely rebuilt in the past, only to find that the basic urban problems of congestion and transportation had become more insoluble than ever. This time the reconstruction will be by public initiative, at considerable cost to the taxpayers, who had better make sure they are getting their money's worth in improved civic arrangements.

Moreover, the Housing Act offers specific encouragment for metropolitan and regional planning, and for the development of new outlying communities as well as slum clearance. These new tools should be exceedingly important right now, when the housing shortage will force construction on vacant sites before wholesale clearance can be tackled. But in most areas the full use of these tools depends on basic changes in the structure and functioning of chaotic and overlapping local governments. These changes are long overdue, but they will be unpopular with politicians and property owners wedded to status quo arrangements. Only a great metropolitan civic movement can force action for unified planning and development.

Local decisions about housing and land use will also affect very greatly the whole future pattern of race and class relations in every community. In the North at least, the day of enforced residential segregation by color is unquestionably drawing to a close. But the transition will be quick or slow, smooth or violent, depending wholly on the quality and good sense of responsible civic leadership. In my opinion, there is likely to be more delay and controversy in the long run in the communities that try to temporize than in cities like New York and San Francisco, where a positive official stand against subsidized segregation has already been taken.

Similarly, only enlightened citizen action can stop the trend toward wholesale *class* segregation. The increasing standardization of rents, prices and building types over vast areas is the diametrical opposite of bona fide "neighborhood planning," which receives so much lip-service today.

What it all comes down to is the fact that every town, metropolitan area and rural region in this country should have an energetic citizens' housing and planning organization, representing a cross-section of popular interests and professional knowledge, intimately acquainted with the operations of local agencies, and in close touch with such national groups as the National Housing Conference in Washington. The latter played a major role in formulating the new Housing Act and steering it through Congress because all the public interest organizations concerned with better housing conditions made it their information center and focal point. Some such coördinated leadership is now needed in every community.

Question No. 2: *Coöperative housing to fill the "gap."* The Housing Act is very good so far as it goes. But it still leaves a large no man's land in the housing market: the families who are ineligible for subsidized public housing but who cannot afford the ordinary speculative home as currently produced.

There is nothing new about the limited market for private-housing enterprise. But today the veterans and labor organizations are acutely interested in housing, and they are well aware of the fact that most of their members happen to be in the "gap." They also know that all the successive promises of the speculative builders and prefabricators have miserably failed to date. They supported the General Housing Act, but they still want something more. And one of the things they are interested in is coöperatives.

There has been, in fact, a spontaneous burst of interest in coöperative housing all over the country ever since the war.* The National Coöperative Mutual Housing Association lists about a hundred such groups, of whom it has some direct knowledge. Nothing could be mo important for the future of housing and communi in America than to implement this movement. has happened to all these hopeful ventures except delay and frustration. A handful- a dozen—have actually started constructi or less coöperative basis. But these were with solid financial resources of their c

s of dirt So over t skimme

* For example, an excellent recent series *American City*, on "Ideas from Sweden for ap tive Housing Program," by Donald and As Detroit city planners who helped to org Workers' venture in that city.

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land without zoning impediments or restrictive covenants, first-rate leadership and technical advice, and enough prestige and "influence" of one kind or another to induce the Federal Housing Administration and some lending institution to work with them.

What most groups interested in coöperative homes *must* have are:

¶ Cheap over-all long-term financing, from a source which is seriously interested in promoting successful coöperative housing. In the United States this means a federal agency, independent of the FHA.

¶ Experienced guidance in organization and efficient coördination among separate local groups in the matter of planning, paper-work, perhaps even construction and management. In Europe this is usually done by strong central housing-coöperative organizations, in collaboration with local public agencies.

¶ First-rate technical aid all along the way, from site selection to design and operation.

¶ Sympathetic encouragement from the local government, particularly planning and zoning agencies, in site acquisition and community layout, provision of utilities, etc. Most Swedish and Dutch cities actually acquire and plan the sites for coöperative projects, and this would even be possible in some cases in the United States under the new provisions of the General Housing Act.

This is not an unthinkable program for the United States. In fact a great many bills have been introduced in both Houses this term, with thoroughly bipartisan sponsorship, which would make a real start from the federal end at least. These bills provide for direct federal loans at around three percent to coöperative and other non-profit housing corporations, to be administered by a new agency paralleling the FHA and the PHA. Most important of these proposals is the Sparkman-Spence bill, an omnibus "private housing" measure which includes substantial encouragement for coöperative housing (along with some dubious aids for speculative builders and veteran home purchasers).

None of the current Congressional proposals will cover the whole "gap": under present conditions a large part of the middle group cannot be reached without a subsidy of some kind. But they *would* meet a healthy new demand in a hitherto untouched market. And something of the kind is imperative if only to olve the shortage, since speculative building is leveling f and public housing is still irrevocably tied to the ct replacement of an equivalent number of slums. me commercial building interests might be won o such a program, now that the cream has been d off the speculative market. Here is a whole new field of enterprise for an efficient home-builder who would be satisfied with a modest profit on purely construction operations. Many prefabricators are already actively interested: this is just the sort of "distribution" system they need. Energetic and experimental coöperative leadership *might* (as it did in Scandinavia) set a new pace, in terms of design and management, for both speculative and public housing, and in any case more varied and better-balanced neighborhood planning would be possible. And, finally, such a program should impose less risk on the taxpayers than that involved in much of the present FHA and VA operations.

What is the outlook for immediate enactment? The Sparkman-Spence bill was reported favorably, pretty much intact, by the Senate Banking and Currency Committee. But the House Committee finally eliminated the coöperative housing title while preserving all the more questionable features. This crucial defeat was mainly due to waning enthusiasm in the White House in the face of opposition by HHFA Administrator Raymond M. Foley, and it probably means that no coöperative program will be enacted this summer. But by next year the ground-swell of interest among veteran and labor groups may well push coöperative housing through Congress. And the interim will not be wasted if it produces some bona fide concrete analysis of the problems and possibilities of coöperative housing under American conditions. The Sparkman-Spence proposals can be seriously questioned in several administrative details, but the "right" answers will never be found at the abstract Washington level. They will only come from local groups who really want to get coöperative homes.

But in America we mainly learn in the doing, and this is one program we must start very soon, whether we know all the answers or not. It's needed not only to help solve the shortage, but for the most profound social and psychological reasons as well. Under the General Housing Act we shall be building thousands of homes for *low*-income families, because this is the one and only way to get rid of slums and rehouse slum dwellers. But it would be very wrong to carry out a vast program for the bottom group while totally neglecting the families of middle or average means. Hindsight now suggests, as Helen Gahagan Douglas pointed out at the housing convention, that one of the mistakes made by the liberal democratic governments in Germany and Austria before the Fascists took over, a mistake which may even have fostered middle-class Fascism, was a tendency to neglect the particular needs and wants of this group in housing reform and other social services.

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HAROLD L. ICKES: America's Royal Family

I DOUBT WHETHER there are any people in the world who love royalty as do we Americans. And now, by-passing the United Nations, we have bought and are sustaining a yard-wide and "pre-shrunk" royal family, in the persons of the King and Queen of Greece, and their progeny. To be sure, they are of German descent and of Nazi inclinations. Moreover, the sturdy Republicans of Greece have driven this royal house out of Athens more than once. But King Paul and Queen Frederika, with their ornamental retainers, have been hammered back into Greece by American gold as a dentist hammers that same metal into a cavity.

It is to be hoped that their majesties are sound of wind and limb. In some two years, they have cost us more than a billion dollars. At the moment, Congress is still wrestling with a Marshall Plan appropriation bill that carries hundreds of millions of more dollars for Greece. Nor will this be the last raid upon our treasury. There are those who believe that the Greeks will be able heroically to wage war against Communists so long as there is a free flow of money from the United States. If put to it, the Royalists in Greece would probably be able to supply "Communists" to keep the martial show going. At the moment, the Greek national army, well-equipped and well-fed by American largess, is staging another campaign against the rebels. If bold claims are to be credited any more than they have been in the past, our royal army will smite the rebels, hip and thigh, and restore peace to a harried land.

I will believe this when I see it. I am one of those who suspect that since the Greek (American) Royalists have discovered that they can live in luxury on the proceeds of war, they will continue to make a living out of war.

Louis E. Wyman, counsel for the Joint Congressional Committee on European Aid, reported, according to the New York *Times* a short time ago, that "many American officials live and act in a disruptively ostentatious manner in a country where poverty and tragedy are on all sides and in a nation of 7,500,000 people of whom approximately 1,800 individuals have wealth and the remainder are very poor." Returning Army officers speak almost with nostalgia of the gracious condescension with which Queen Frederika partakes of tea with them. At any rate, she is making some return for American largess. Not only are we financing the German-Greek royal house, at least indirectly, and the Greek army, we are offering hospitality, principally in New York City, to a large number of wealthy Greek émigrés who, after the example of their royal house, abstain from financing their own country so long as we will do it for them.

I do not doubt that, as in the past, we will be hearing news of disaster overwhelming the Greek rebels. Then will follow, if we may judge by experience, a lull during which the rebels will recruit their strength, largely from the "royalist" Athens area. In due course, there will be a further frantic call for more American money, to say nothing of troops. By supplying money and military advice, it would seem that the United States is participating in a civil war in a foreign land.

I again suggest that we find out, without loss of time and by means of a carefully supervised and honestly conducted election, just what kind of a government the people of Greece really want. If they wish to continue under their German King and Queen, that is their privilege. But if by any chance they prefer to establish a republic, then why should money from the greatest republic that the world has ever seen be used to subject convinced republicans to an imported monarchy? Recently J. A. Sofianopoulos wrote in the *Nation* that the United States has collaborated with the various Greek governments since March, 1946, although "perfectly aware of their incapacity and corruption." This liberal former Foreign Minister of Greece said further:

> If the United States had helped set up a government drawn from progressive and enlightened elements, if it had insisted upon the application of democratic methods, the rebels would not have acquired any strength. . . . The present Parliament is like a brawling tavern. . . . We have now reached the seventh government since the March, 1946, elections. The members of the many American commissions have practically assumed control of military operations and of the country's economy, but with a few exceptions they have shown such a lack of political wisdom that even the sham Parliament has loudly protested against their excessive interference.

And J. A. Del Vayo, foreign editor of the same liberal publication, writes that he has been assured by Miltiades Porphyrogenis, Chairman of the Control Committee of the Greek Communist Party, that his party would not only accept the United Nations' supervision of such an election, but would abide by any decision made by the Greek people.

Of course, the Communists might renege on this, but is it not worth trying if only to show them up if they should renege?

HAROLD L. ICKES

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BOOKS IN REVIEW

THE SCIENCE OF INHUMAN RELATIONS

by Robert S. Lynd

LIKE A NUMBER of other things in these confused times, these volumes carry magnificent promise and serious threat. On the one hand, social science is seen at work on the urgent affairs of contemporary man. "For the first time on such a scale," remarks the foreword to volume I, "the attempt to direct human behavior was, in part at least, based on scientific evidence. If this method could be developed and more widely used, it might provide further impetus for a great advance in the social relations of man." Throughout the volumes whole armies of soldiers are studied as persons differing from one another in inner make-up; and their relations with each other —authority, loyalty, coöperation, morale—are approached on a correspondingly complex level.

THE AMERICAN SOLDIER, Vols. I and II: *Adjustment During Army Life* and *Combat and Its Aftermath,* by Samuel A. Stouffer and associates; Vol. III: *Experiments on Mass Communication,* by Carl I. Hovland and associates (Princeton University Press; vols. I and II, $7.50 each, $13.50 together; vol. III, $5).

This sophisticated and seemingly hopeful analysis went forward under that most encrusted of institutions, the Army, whose theory has been that "man is the one unchangeable element in war," and whose regulations on discipline have remained essentially unchanged since they were copied from the regulations of the noble-and-peasant army of royal France of 1788. Here would seem to be constructive change indeed!

But, on the other hand, these volumes depict science being used with great skill to sort out and to control men for purposes not of their own willing. It is a significant measure of the impotence of liberal democracy that it must increasingly use its social sciences not directly on democracy's own problems, but tangentially and indirectly; it must pick up the crumbs from private business research on such problems as how to gauge audience reaction so as to put together profitable synthetic radio programs and movies, or, as in the present case, from Army research on how to turn frightened draftees into tough soldiers who will fight a war whose purposes they do not understand. With such socially extraneous purposes controlling the use of social science, each advance in its use tends to make it an instrument of mass control, and thereby a further threat to democracy.

To say the above is not to cast reflection upon the resourcefulness and technical quality of the work of Dr. Stouffer and his staff in the Research Branch, Information and Education Division of the Army. World War I, through the experience it gave to Edwin M. Gay and Wesley C. Mitchell and their co-workers in the War Industries Board, provided the impetus to the most characteristic advance of American economics in this century, namely, the systematic development of statistical series and their analysis in such postwar agencies as the National Bureau of Economic Research. Similarly, the more recent war bids fair to advance the pioneering work of men like Paul F. Lazarsfeld into a similar great period of technical maturation in the field of human relations. And these three volumes, and a fourth to follow later, will symbolize and focus this advance.

Scientists may rationalize the fact that they work on Caesar's problems by saying that at this stage in the development of the science of human relations the perfecting of research techniques is all-important. But one wonders again and again throughout these 1,600 pages: What kind of society would that society be which developed its skills not on war but on the problems of peace; not by discovering how to lessen men's fear in battle but how to lessen the massive insecurities of civilian life; not by developing the synthetic morale of an army but the living tissue of democratic social solidarity; not in the hopeless search for palliatives for the caste gulf between officers and men, but in discovering the optimum conditions of responsible democratic relations among men of different capacities and roles?

The first two of the three volumes are closely related. If the general reader can afford to purchase only one volume, I recommend the first. The third volume is a specialist's book on techniques of mass communication, reporting experimental studies on the effectiveness of films and other informational and propaganda media.

Dr. Stouffer begins volume I with Tolstoy's statement in *War and Peace* that "In warfare the force of armies is the product of the mass multiplied by something else, an unknown *x*." To discover the nature of this *x*, as it bore on the selection, training and subsequent behavior of soldiers in battle, was the assignment of the Research Branch. Centrally, they were studying the motivation and social adjustment of men with different backgrounds, susceptibilities and lengths of service to army routine and to combat conditions—such things as why they fought, differences in battle fear, who were the psychoneurotics, which men sought promotion, how men rated the various branches of the service, and what they thought of their officers.

Between Pearl Harbor and the end of the war samplings of soldiers of all ranks, aggregating more than half a

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million, were studied, principally through anonymous questionnaires. The findings became, in turn, the basis for Army-command decisions. The psychoneurotic inventory used in all induction centers toward the end of the war was developed in the Research Branch; and the point system for demobilization and the GI Bill were based on its studies of soldier attitudes and postwar plans.

The level of education of the soldiers in this war presented new problems. Between 1916 and 1940 the number of high-school students in the United States had increased more than fourfold and of college students three-and-one-half fold. In civilian life the numbers of farmers and unskilled laborers had decreased and the new, white-collar middle-class had increased. This meant a generally higher level of personal expectations, more concern as to "what I can get out of the Army," and greater readiness to criticize traditional Army ways of treating soldiers as second in patience only to the Army mule.

These volumes confirm the popular suspicion that American soldiers had only hazy ideas as to what the war was all about. Our democracy, chronically lax as regards the development of a positive ideology about itself and its purposes, was ill-equipped—and, one suspects, officially reluctant—to encourage free thinking by its soldiers about why they fought. Volume I concludes:

> The general picture in this volume of men preoccupied with minimizing their discomforts, acquiring higher rank or pay, securing safe jobs which would offer training useful in civilian life, displaying aggressions against the Army in many different ways, and in getting out of the Army as fast as possible does not suggest a particularly inspired work performance in the American Army.

Citing a study of American veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War by Dollard, of Yale, the passage continues:

> Here ideological convictions appear to play a much more powerful role than in the American Army. Dollard describes its role by saying: ". . . Identification with cause is like a joker in a deck of cards: it can substitute for any other card. The man who has it can better bear inferior material, temporary defeat, uneasiness, or fear." . . . It is possible [the chapter concludes] that the minimal character of ideological motivation increased the psychological cost of the war. Army psychiatrists thought so.

With little or no ideology, or meaning, to tie together what the Army command wanted and what the soldier wanted, a series of situations developed akin to those that prevail in civilian industry. A man's class fate pursued him into the Army, and the possibility of a commission was heavily conditioned by the amount of one's education. The grade-school man tended to get either a combat job or an unskilled or semi-skilled labor job.

Promotion in the Army seemed almost as remote and arbitrary as it does to men on the floor of a factory. One of the most numerous types of comment written in answer to the question, "In general, have you gotten a square deal in the Army?" concerned injustice felt with respect to promotion. Innovators were side-tracked in the military world of conformity; "officers who themselves were conformists were the most likely to have been promoted"—and they, in turn, preferred the conformists among their juniors. After the first six months in the Army, soldiers' belief in "ability" as the basis of promotion dropped off by half, and "boot-licking and playing politics" doubled in frequency among their answers.

At war's end (November, 1945), 60 percent of the officers and 80 percent of the enlisted men answered "Yes" to the statement, "Promotion is based on *who* you know, not *what* you know." And the best educated enlisted men tended to be most cynical about Army promotion methods. Near the end of the war only 25 percent of the soldiers answered "Yes" to the statement, "Most *soldiers* think that if you are only a private or Pfc, it's because you weren't good enough to get a rating"; but 81 percent answered "Yes" to the same proposition with "most *civilians*" substituted for "most *soldiers*." Here is the characteristic dilemma of youth in our society: the authoritative adult world says, "You can, if you're any good," while it renders the promotional situation dim and erratic.

Between labor and bosses in the Army the situation was one of acute class consciousness and intermittent warfare—with no unions on the men's side. And the class with power used and signalized its power directly to preëmpt scarce goods, notably "the supply of attractive women, liquor, or entertainment."

At the close of the war, three-fourths of a cross-section of enlisted men in the United States agreed that "Most officers are more interested in getting promoted than in doing a good job"; and more than one-third of the company-grade officers also agreed. And, as compared with these figures for troops in the United States, it should be noted that troops overseas (matched for branch of service, amount of education and length of service with troops in the United States) were more sharply critical of their officers than were troops who had not yet gone overseas. No wonder "it was difficult, especially early in the war, to get some elements in the Army leadership to permit questioning of soldiers on attitudes toward officers"; and that the authorities were "even more reluctant to permit experimental studies to test hypotheses about leadership"!

The process by which men are remolded in the transition from GI to commissioned "shave-tail" is brilliantly analyzed by a member of the Research Branch who went through Officer Candidate School. Officer training is seen as a gruelling experience aimed deliberately at separating the candidate from his old enlisted-man self and identifying him with an officer-caste self aggressively oriented against all GIs.

The candidate in OCS "is subjected to a nearly catastrophic experience, which breaks down to a large extent his previous personality organization." Under constant hazing and fear of being "washed out" of OCS

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he is first made to identify himself with extreme GI subservience, and then shown that such abject obedience in the ranks is a necessary condition for the officer leadership to which he aspires. Once commissioned, "To feel himself a man again and to reduce his insecurity, he seeks aggressively to assert his superiority over someone else." So the new 90-Day-Wonder, "somewhat insecure in his role and perhaps a little guilty at his favored status over his previous enlisted confreres, reactively asserts his status, and finds in the OCS ordeal a justification for his new prerogatives; he *earned* them."

In reading the chapter on "Control of Fear in Combat" one gets an eerie sense that perhaps our entire "civilization," including that part of it which studies such grotesque things as the social relations of men out to kill their fellowmen, is as blind as the Gadarene swine. Human muscle and nerve quail before the terror of modern warfare. Some crack up more easily than others: 40 percent of the Army psychoneurotics, according to a sample of troops still in the United States, were 30 years of age and older, whereas only 20 percent of the privates in the Army, 23 percent of the noncoms, and 20 percent of the officers were 30 or over. This suggests that older men, even prior to combat, found the Army more difficult. Likewise, the psychoneurotics contained markedly more men of low education, 75 percent of them not having graduated from high school, whereas only 57 percent of the Army privates fell in that educational category.

The Army has progressed so far as to do away with the old fiction that "only a sissy is afraid"; and the official handbook, "Army Life," issued to all trainees, says frankly: "YOU'LL BE SCARED. . . . Before you go into battle, you'll be frightened at the uncertainty, at the thought of being killed. . . . If you say you're not scared, you'll be a cocky fool." And two-thirds to three-fourths of many samples of both infantry officers and men with combat experience answered the question as to what should be done with men who crack up in action by saying that they should be treated as sick men, while never more than six percent said that they should be punished as cowards.

But if man becomes slightly more humane as Moloch becomes more terrifying, the ultimate issue lies surely against the fragile nervous system in this race between mechanical catastrophe and human fortitude. One reads here the pathetic inventories of percentages of men who thought indicated types of enemy weapons "most frightening," and of how many vomited, lost control of bladder or bowels, and so on, in combat. The research staff seizes upon this problem of "control of fear in combat" with the eager-beaver mood in which it confronts all problems of making bigger-and-better fighting men.

How, it asks, do you get men used to battle conditions? Gradually? Or rapidly, to prevent anxiety's mounting over a period of increasing dosage? And then the Research Branch is off with a flock of questionnaires as to what kinds of additional training soldiers thought they should have had. And the most frequent answer was, "Give men more training under live ammunition"; and the report goes on to quote the comment, "A few will get killed, but the others will learn."

An acute, unstudied problem concerns the question: How does a society learn from experience? The assumption is that we are all rational and that, collectively, we are shrewd enough not to make major mistakes twice. But, actually, we differ as individuals in intelligence; classes have different stakes in "the truth"; all media of communication are increasingly controlled. As a result, mass learning is facilitated *or* disconcerted almost at will. What is learned, and by whom, is highly selected and distorted. What may the eight million men in the Army have learned from their experience in this war? These volumes reveal that, the longer they experienced both army life and war, the more they disliked both; they endured when they had to, and escaped as soon as ever they could.

By war's end the troops were so fed up that the proportion of one-third of the samples of soldiers overseas who said in early 1944 and again in April, 1945, that they "very often" or "sometimes" felt that the war was not worth fighting jumped in the months immediately following VE Day to almost one-half. In November, 1945, a representative cross-section of men who had been in the Army one to three years, half of them returnees from overseas and half men who had not been overseas, were asked to respond to the statement, "On the whole, I think the Army has helped me more than it has hurt me." Fifty-eight to 76 percent, depending upon age and education, disagreed with this appraisal of their military experience.

It looks as though these men had learned plenty! What of it will stick? One thinks of the trigger-happy annual reunions of Harry Truman's Battery D, of Legion conventions and of college reunions in which paunchy men try to recreate the mood of "the finest time of our lives." Why this compulsive nostalgia? Two things seem relevant here:

(1) In the Army men did things together, they hung together with terrible tenacity. As an infantryman remarked, "You know the men in your outfit. You have to be loyal to them. The men get close-knit together. . . . They begin to think the world of each other. It's the main thing that keeps a guy from going haywire." This instant, secure belonging stands in sharp contrast to the socially more isolated, tentative and competitive world of civilian life.

(2) Whatever one may say about the lack of supporting ideology in our Army, war does have a clear objective: to defeat an always very tangible enemy and get the job done. Already, in the spring of 1945, soldiers were bracing themselves against the return to civilian life for which they hankered so ardently: Only a third of them thought the United States would be a better place to live than it was before the war; and only a fifth thought that most soldiers would find it "very easy" or "fairly easy" to get the kind of jobs

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they wanted. The close of volume II quotes ex-soldiers on the kind of "let-down feeling" of disappointment so many of them had after returning to civilian life.

These men now back in civilian life and showing up among the small-business failures and the unemployed took a licking in the Army—from the officer-caste, from the deprivations of army life and from the dangers of battle. In sheer self-defense they learned to strut their aggressiveness and to proclaim their superiority to, and their rights over, the civilian world, and this fund of "rights" becomes larger in retrospect. Many of those who got promotions were dressed in a completeness and arbitrariness of authority which they could hardly expect to recapture in civilian life.

No experience as big as a war is just an interlude; most of its participants will be different for the rest of their lives. The Army was a monster rock-crusher, breaking non-conformity down to standard size. In this situation dissent did not disappear but became patterned as escapades against the collectivity: going AWOL, scrounging, wangling, fixing, playing "the old army game." From the intense experiences of doing things together and standing by each other, important lessons might have been brought back to our atomistic civilian life; but the Army experience of "doing things together" was debased and oriented against society by the fact that it had so little wider social reference and was allowed so largely to assume the forms of acts of aggression by one segment of the Army society against the rest, *e. g.*, officers against enlisted men and vice versa, and front-line arrogance against rear supporting troops.

So these very men who so recently hated the coercions and violence of war may become the toughest champions of violence and suppression; just as the self-made man who came up the hard way tends to be the most active opponent of change in the system under which he once suffered. Fortified by their sense of "rights" against society and of nostalgia for "the greatest time of our lives," these dragon's teeth may yet breed strife against the very values of democracy and peace for which they presumably fought.

THIS WAY OUT

THE WHOLE OF THEIR LIVES, by Benjamin Gitlow (Scribner's; $3.50).

THE PHENOMENON of the ex-Communist is one that has proved both puzzling and disturbing to American liberals. The very notion of a renegade runs counter to the American sense of sportsmanship and fair play. To the muddled "liberal" who still measures "liberalism" in terms of its proximity to Communism, the "betrayal of the Soviet Union" constitutes in itself a betrayal of liberal doctrine. More pertinently, the sensational way in which many of the ex-Communists have dramatized and exploited their "change of heart" has created an unsavory impression. Benjamin Gitlow does not belong to that group. His road to Communism was deeply rooted and thoughtful and his break with the movement was slow and painful.

Gitlow joined the Socialist Party at the age of 16 and was one of its most active members until the party split in 1919. He was one of the three founders of the Communist Labor Party, later to become the Communist Party of the United States, and for the next ten years was untiring in his devotion to the "cause," even at the risk of grave personal danger. For openly denouncing the United States Government as a "capitalist dictatorship" and calling for its violent overthrow he was sentenced to from five to ten years' imprisonment at hard labor under the New York State criminal-anarchy statute. After serving three years in Sing Sing he was pardoned by Governor Al Smith and resumed his revolutionary activities.

During the ten years of his Communist affiliation he was one of the party's most important leaders. He was twice Communist candidate for Vice President, was editor-in-chief of the Communist daily, was a member of the important Political Committee of the party, member of the secretariat of three that ran the party, General Secretary of the party and also a member of the Executive Committee of the Profintern (Red Trade Union International). In these and other capacities Gitlow was an active participant in high Communist councils and conferred many times with Stalin and other ranking Communist leaders. No American Communist had had a better opportunity to observe the operation of the Communist machine.

Gitlow's exit from the Communist movement was similarly sincere, genuine and courageous. He was the only representative of the American Communist Party who dared openly to defy Stalin in Moscow and he was thereupon ousted from the party. Unlike many other former Communists, Gitlow did not hurry to the market place to sell his "lurid stories" to sensation-seeking newspapers and magazines and cash in on his anti-Communism. Only after ten years of study of the history of the Russian Revolution and after long and thoughtful reëvaluation of his previous social, economic and moral views in the light of events in Europe and Asia did he finally heed the advice of socialist and liberal friends and put down his experiences in book form. All during these years he worked hard for a living. Whether one agrees with Gitlow's present views or not, his idealism, personal honesty and integrity have never been questioned.

In 1940 Gitlow published *I Confess*, which described in detail how he refused in 1929 to carry out the orders of Stalin. *The Whole of Their Lives* is in part a reworking of the earlier book, but also contains much new material. It is divided into two parts: the first is an account of what he observed during the ten years of his leadership in the Communist movement; the second deals with the events during the eighteen years after his expulsion. It is the story not only of the legally functioning Communist Party but also of the Communist underground and underworld—a realm unknown even

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to most loyal Communists. It is a sordid but dramatic story based on the author's own experience supplemented by information gathered from sources he trusts.

Gitlow's description of Communist activities in the United States confirms the testimony of other former Communists that the party here is controlled and financed by the Kremlin through secret agents of Moscow who permanently reside in the United States. They decide, says the author, who the official party leaders and spokesmen should be and what policy they should pursue. Gitlow offers a detailed account of how the Soviet government spent millions of dollars to smash the Socialist Party and to capture the trade unions and the various progressive political movements. He tells about the activities of the OGPU agents in the United States, about their intimate connections with Communist leaders. He describes murders that he is convinced were committed in the US by Soviet agents. Names, aliases and full details are provided. He offers a most illuminating description of how every struggle within the Russian Bolshevik Party and every change in Soviet policy was reflected in the American Communist Party.

Gitlow maintains that Stalin never dissolved the Comintern. It was merely reorganized in 1943 and has since continued its existence in secret. The Cominform is not a substitute for the Comintern. According to Gitlow, the Cominform is the reorganized Western European Bureau of the Comintern which in pre-Hitler days functioned in Berlin, moved to Copenhagen after Hitler took over, and during the war switched to Stockholm. A revealing item in Gitlow's book is the account of the secret Communist Convention which took place in 1922 in a Michigan woods not far from Bridgeman, and in which three high emissaries from Moscow participated. No less interesting is his recollection of the Congress of the Profintern in Moscow in 1927 and of the banquet that followed. Gitlow describes the Soviet Communist universities and academies in which scores of thousands of foreign Communists are trained for leadership and for the underground work of the Comintern and the NKVD throughout the world. President Gottwald and Marshal Tito, as well as most of the present leaders of the satellite countries and the top leaders of the Communist Parties in Italy, Greece, France, Austria, China, India, Indo-China, the United States and the South American countries, are listed as graduates of these "academies."

The greater portion of Gitlow's book is devoted to the Communist Party in the United States:

> The men and women who took the road to Communism [writes Gitlow] became the voluntary victims of a conditioning process which subjugated the will of the individual to the will of the organization. Honest idealists became knaves. Dreamers and visionaries, the timid souls among the radicals, were transformed into Machiavellian political tricksters and hardened conspirators. Men and women imbued with a compassionate tenderness for others became sadistic gangsters. Intellectuals deserted the truth to become Communist artists in uniform prostituting their abilities in order to serve the party line and pollute the cultural life in America.

Unfortunately, the book is poorly organized and annoyingly repetitious, and many may consider it ill-advised to revive long-forgotten intra-party tales and charges against persons who left the Communist movement more than a decade ago and are now rendering valuable service to the cause of liberalism and democracy. In general Gitlow greatly exaggerates the role of the Communist Party in the social and political movements in this country and especially its part in the New Deal. Like other ex-Communists, he has often made the picture blacker than it really is. But his over-all analysis of the functioning of the Communist apparatus both here and abroad is accurate and reliable. This is the most authoritative account of the Communist movement in the US that has yet been written. DAVID SHUB

David Shub is the author of Lenin: A Biography. He has edited several other books and has contributed to many publications.

WORTH REPRINTING

THE AWKWARD AGE, by Henry James. Note by Alan Hodge (Pantheon Books; $1.75).

"I'M SORRY to say the book has done nothing to speak of; I've never in all my experience seen one treated with more general and complete disrespect." So the original publisher of *The Awkward Age* reported to Henry James. And James admitted, in a letter to a friend, "that ingenious volume appears to have excited little *but* bewilderment —except, indeed . . . thick-witted denunciation." Nor has the subsequent history of the book corrected its original neglect; it has been widely unread, or if read, unfinished (and it must be admitted that there is a high mortality rate, even among sturdy confirmed Jamesians, in the desert spaces of Books VI and VII). But James vigorously defended his novel and repeatedly expressed a special parental affection for this unfavored offspring. If for nothing else, that defense and affection would merit the book a careful reading.

The "idea" of the novel, as James jotted it down in his Notebooks, is that of Nanda Brookenham, "the little London girl who grows up to 'sit with' the free-talking modern young mother —reaches seventeen, eighteen, etc.— comes out—and, not marrying, has to 'be there'—and, though the conversation is supposed to be expurgated for her, inevitably hears, overhears, guesses, follows, takes in, becomes acquainted with, horrors."

Sitting with her mother means, for Nanda, in her mother's drawing room with her mother's fastidious coterie, as concentrated a group of James's "super subtle fry" as is to be found anywhere in his novels. The book is almost all conversation or external effects (written "as if I were in fact constructing a play," says James in the preface), and the talk in Mrs. Brookenham's "temple of analysis" is a highly elaborate and self-conscious rite. The friends are united in "the free surrender to the play of perception," and their relations and their loyalty amount simply to the fact that "the

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unanimous occupants [were] almost more concerned for each other's vibrations than for anything else."

The focal point and chief "subject" as well as leader of the group is Mrs. Brookenham. "I often feel," she says, "as if I were a circus-woman, in pink tights and no particular skirts, riding half a dozen horses at once—we're all in the troupe now." The tremendous egotism suggested by that figure is explicit in her reference to her friends as "things that fate seems somehow to have given me as the occupation of my odd moments." Those quotations (and others as penetrating) sum her up and give her away. The remarkable thing is the way they are reached by a solid rendering of her beauty, her touching, wan helplessness, and "her special sign—an innocence dimly tragic"; in short, her "effect," achieved "by some trick that had never been exposed." The trick is exposed by the end of the book, as well as a complex of hypocrisies, shifts, dodges and lies, which, together with her rapacious proprietary air toward her circle and the condoned irregularities of its members, makes her a direct forerunner of Mme. Verdurin.

Introduced to the circle and subject to the subtly despoiling influence of this lady are three Jamesian innocents: Mr. Longdon, an elderly gentleman up from the country, whose right of admission is his ancient (and hopeless) love for Mrs. Brookenham's mother; Nanda, down, at last, from the children's quarters; and "little Aggie," a friend of the latter, and a niece of one of the permanent members. The innocence of the young girls is thus described and contrasted: "Both girls struck [Mr. Longdon] as lambs with the great shambles of life in their future; but while one [Aggie], with its neck in a pink ribbon, had no consciousness but that of being fed from the hand with the small sweet biscuit of unobjectionable knowledge, the other [Nanda] struggled with instincts and forebodings, with the suspicion of its doom and the farborne scent, in the flowery fields, of blood." The innocence and "beauty of Aggie is that she knows nothing—but absolutely, utterly: not the least little tittle of anything." In a sophisticated society, "she had been deliberately prepared for consumption and . . . the gentleness of her spirit had immensely helped the preparation." She succumbs to a familiar fate: a rich unhappy marriage and the loose fashionable life of Mrs. Brookenham's circle.

On the other hand, despite the concerted effort to preserve "the preposterous fiction . . . of Nanda's blankness of mind," that young lady "knows" everything; by a rather lurid figure she is "a sort of drain-pipe with everything flowing through." But Nanda is not contaminated. Her innocence is in a sense *preserved* by complete knowledge and a fine intelligence. She sees her mother's set to see *through* it. The innocence of Aggie is merely a social asset of the *jeune fille* and these people understand her inevitable corruption as "one of us." But the purity of Nanda is less fragile: it defies them. She and Mr. Longdon together are a match for her mother and their combined resistance threatens to shatter the circle.

James declared: "I think Mrs. Brookenham the best thing I've ever done"; it is certainly not an unwarranted preference. And to the frequent charge of over-treatment he replied: "The thing carries itself to mature and gratified sense as with every symptom of soundness, and insolence of health and joy." James's own bewilderment and impatience plead with us across the years, and perhaps this new edition in a neat and charming volume will bring a later public around to his own opinion. For in spite of difficulties, and the dull spots mentioned, *The Awkward Age* is in many ways uniquely brilliant and one of the major (and last) novels of his middle period.

JOHN FARRELLY

THEATRE LIFE

It is a common practice in all the arts to arrive at an understanding of a particular artist's work by examining the artist's environment. Because the theatre is thought of chiefly as show business, related to sensationalism rather than to expression, what we usually learn about the life of people in the theatre is the story of their careers in terms of parts played, failures, successes, hobbies and eccentricities. But the environment in which theatre people live is as much part of their quality as their specific stage experience and their talent. Readers may remember my statement here last winter that the superiority of Laurence Olivier over the perhaps more gifted Alfred Lunt is due in good measure to certain traditions of the English theatre world, which demand more of the actor than continuous box-office success.

It is possible for a healthy theatre —a theatre that maintains a continuity of work on the basis of a consistent artistic program—to provide its members with a foundation that will in itself serve as an educational force. The American theatre worker is footloose. He is attached to nothing, and is therefore obliged to spend most of his time either looking for an engagement, worrying about his next one or, when he is associated with a hit, to forget the necessity of considering his future. Our haphazard, accidental production system creates an atmosphere of haste, restlessness, superficiality in our whole theatrical environment. The American actor—most often a decent, likeable, eager fellow—rarely possesses any sense of personal dignity, rarely has that appearance of maturity which makes even his less dignified European counterpart more imposing on the stage. Most American actors begin and end as kids.

The American actor before 1919 often seemed stuffy, magniloquently foolish, overawed by the color and glamor of his profession. Yesterday's thespian offered a target for facile jibes. But the background of the old-

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time actor helped give him a kind of force that the actor today no longer appears to have. Whether or not he was employed, he felt confident that a theatre existed for him to work in. Since the theatre in those days was generally considered special, dangerous, perhaps not altogether respectable, being an actor meant being adventurous, tough, daring, defiantly "gay" or proud with the boldness of one liberated from society's narrow conventions. All this gave the actor then a kind of hardy, dashing quality that made his very presence on and off the stage interesting. Because to survive he had to be one, he nearly always was a personality.

Today the actor belongs to a union, is impressed with his duties as a citizen, tries to make careful business deals and is convinced that he is or ought to be like everyone else. But his profession is not at all ordinary and, in the practical sense of steady work, not a profession at all. Frequently this contradiction produces a frightened, self-conscious, wistful, deluded creature who cannot think or behave with craftsmanlike accuracy or realism in the theatre or in life. His situation deprives him of that independent sense of his own worth which gives a man power. If the actor is sufficiently lucky to become efficient and moderately successful in terms of earning his livelihood (through jobs in radio, television, commercial movies and an occasional part on Broadway or in Hollywood), his very commercial maneuverability often renders him as smooth and dull as the "ordinary person"—that rubber-stamp personality that he probably hoped to avoid becoming by going on the stage. If the actor suffers the common fate of his profession—penury—he becomes a lost little man, feeding on nothing much beside the trivialities of his trade: small chit-chat, small curiosity, small drinking and dallying, small pitiful hopes. Such people are incapable of bringing to the theatre anything larger than themselves.

An actor who is called on to play a series of fine plays may acquire a certain stature merely through his contact with such plays. An actor whose theatre comprises a group of serious craftsmen (writers, directors, scenic artists, etc.) is by that fact alone subject to influences that may enrich him in his work. The thinness of so much that we see on the stage today is not surprising when we consider the poor human sources from which it must issue. But the individual as such is not wholly to blame. The theatre is itself a life, and if the theatre's life has a meager or corrupt foundation nothing very inspiring can come from it, regardless of the talent that is poured into it.

That the defects of our theatre as a community institution actually limit even our most superior talents may be seen in the case of many of our stars. Our best directors, too, freer and more aware in most instances than the actors, rarely mount the heights of creative effort and accomplishment that their innate abilities and ambitions might spur them to. How many of our finest productions are on the level of Vachtangov's "The Dybbuk," Nemirovich-Danchenko's "Carmencita and the Soldier," Meyerhold's "The Inspector General," Reinhardt's "The Servant of Two Masters"? From the outset our directors are resigned to an excellence sufficient to the standards set by a shackled theatre life.

Is the situation hopeless? It is hopeless only if we allow ourselves to settle into a lethargy of indifference, stupid optimism or routine. Present theatre circumstances demand that the theatre's adherents abandon their playboy giddiness, their café-bar nostalgia and build up within themselves a new *consciousness* of their craft, its possibilities, its requirements, its perils. Simply to wait for a beneficent social-mindedness to descend on men in power so that they may bestow upon us a subsidized "national theatre" is still another fuzzy dream. On what basis theatre people might forge the kind of consciousness needed to bring order into the anarchy of our theatre will be the subject of my next articles.

HAROLD CLURMAN

MUSIC: Tanglewood

THIS SUMMER, Serge Koussevitzky discharged his final assignment as director of the Boston Symphony Orchestra. To be sure, he will be back at Tanglewood next July and August to participate in the school activities of the Berkshire Music Center, of which he is permanent director, and to lead some of the festival concerts. But Charles Muench will be the orchestra's conductor then, and Koussevitzky an honored guest. This summer he was still undisputed monarch of all he surveyed. A valedictory atmosphere hovered over Tanglewood, as though everyone knew that things were going to change, and wished that it were not to happen.

With a fund of energy that belied his 75 years, Koussevitzky conducted 11 of the 14 concerts of the Berkshire Festival (turning over two to Leonard Bernstein and one to Eleazar de Carvalho, Brazilian alumnus of Koussevitzky's conducting classes at Tanglewood). It would be gracious, perhaps, to report that the festival was the crowning achievement of the great conductor's career. That, however, would be to claim too much out of sentiment.

Seeking to make his programs unusually imposing, Koussevitzky overloaded them with difficult works that were relatively unfamiliar to his orchestra. He asked the players to achieve results that were often impossible in the restricted rehearsal time. In other summers he constructed the festival programs largely from music the orchestra had played in Boston during the previous winter season and kept to a minimum the number of pieces requiring fresh preparation. This year he showed no such discretion, listing a number of compositions

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not drawn from the winter repertory, and as a consequence we learned, to a degree that we had not realized before, that even the lordly Boston Orchestra can falter.

There were, it is true, an unforgettable performance of Liszt's tremendous masterpiece, "A Faust Symphony" (scheduled in token of the Goethe bicentennial), and superb versions of Prokofieff's Fifth Symphony and Beethoven's Overture to "Egmont." But Mahler's "The Song of the Earth," the lovely, resigned swan-song of the whole Romantic period, emerged ragged and unevocative; and on the same evening a last-minute shift in the program brought a performance of Roussel's lively Suite in F that would not have reflected credit on a competent small-city orchestra. Perhaps the three final concerts, which have not taken place as I write this column and which include the long-anticipated première of Benjamin Britten's "Spring Symphony," will efface these memories.

I felt sorry for the people who had come hundreds, sometimes thousands, of miles to hear the Mahler and the Roussel, but apparently they did not feel sorry for themselves. After all, a visit to Tanglewood offers, in addition to the orchestra, the freedom of the beautiful grounds with their 231 acres of lawns and majestic trees, superb views of the Berkshires and the Taconics, and memories of Nathaniel Hawthorne, who wrote *The House of Seven Gables* in a house (where a replica now stands) a few hundred feet from the Music Shed.

Tanglewood has become so irresistible a magnet for both tourists and local residents that Heifetz had to be booked as a soloist on a midweek evening because the parking space will not accommodate the number of cars that would have come on a clear Saturday or Sunday. When 15,000 people (which the management considers the saturation figure) all start home at once at the end of a concert, the two-lane road to Lenox develops a transcendental traffic jam. It sometimes takes two hours to gain the wider Pittsfield-New York highway a mile and a half away.

When the New York Philharmonic-Symphony, under Henry Hadley, played the first Berkshire Festival (three programs) in 1934, on an estate in Stockbridge, a total of 5,000 attended the three programs. The switch to Koussevitzky and the Boston Symphony in 1936 raised the attendance, still for three concerts, to 15,000. Since 1937, when the Tanglewood estate was given to the Boston Symphony, and 1938, when Eliel Saarinen's Music Shed was built, the crowds have grown steadily and rapidly (except for the war years, when the festival was suspended). This year nearly 200,000 visitors attended the concerts and the numerous student programs of the Berkshire Music Center (the latter open only to the 3,900 who made cash contributions to become Friends of the Berkshire Music Center).

The Boston Symphony Orchestra owns the grounds, controls every aspect of the festival (including a cafeteria which is not a concession and serves really good, honest food) and operates the Berkshire Music Center, with its 50 teachers and 450 students. A staff of 15 workmen is required to take care of the buildings and grounds, and 25 policemen maintain order and seek—with efficiency but without hope—to regulate the traffic.

During the six-week session of the Berkshire Music Center, most of the living-space in Lenox and in nearby Pittsfield and Stockbridge is preempted by students and faculty members. Accommodations for transients are scarce, and New England thrift impels the local residents to ask prices ranging from $8 to $16 a day for bathless double rooms in their homes. Eating-places are overrun and prices are high. But I have never heard anyone regret that he came to Tanglewood, no matter how much he was charged outside the grounds or how long he was trapped in an immobile line of automobiles. And give the municipality of Lenox credit for a small miracle: not one billboard disfigures the wooded road between the village and Tanglewood.

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
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ON THE AIR: End of Summer

TELEVISION IS NOW selling time by the split second. For five minutes, at 7:55 six nights a week (with Wednesdays off), CBS brings to the TV screen a quickie dreamed up by Goodman Ace. On this program, "Ruthie on the Telephone," there is a cast of two, Ruth Gilbert and Philip Reed. Playing the stereotype Brooklyn babe, Ruthie telephones Philip every evening, professing her love for this man whom she has never met. He balks. She is certain, every time, to pull a stock gag: "Don't fight it; it's bigger than both of us."

Both Ace and CBS are sure they can keep Ruth's romantic urges going for a long time. Maybe they can. Certainly Ace has shown television a new potential—the Philip Morris cigarette people have sponsored the capsule from the very beginning (thus, incidentally, reducing an already brief package to a mere four minutes).

This summer's program schedules, on both radio and television, could well be acting on Ruthie's fatalistic advice. The summer was once the time for radio experimentation. Since it is the first "slow" season for television, following a full year of network operation, the summer now just ending might have been expected to show at least a touch of the pioneer spirit. But the broadcasters, visual as well as aural, seem to have taken the position that the routine is bigger than all of them. The summer's programs have included many that are mediocre, some decidedly regrettable, only three you could call decent, none of distinction.

"A Tree Grows in Brooklyn" is among the lonesome trio. A second is "Hogan's Daughter." Both are NBC radio shows—on Fridays at 8:30 and on Tuesdays at 8, respectively. The "Tree" on radio is somewhat more benign, its theme a bit sweeter than it was in book form. Hogan's triumphs over work and temperance are sometimes just a bit too clever or too pat. But both programs are done with craftsmanship of the kind that will probably have collected enough listeners by fall to earn sponsors.

On television, the exception to the hapless and the dreary is "Mama," on CBS, Fridays at 8. It is a video version of the Kathryn Forbes opus which was *Mama's Bank Account* in book form and "I Remember Mama" on stage and screen. Frank Gabrielson's writing, backed by the acting of Peggy Wood and a cast of uniformly competent principals, keeps the program plugging along with Mama's well-known fortitude.

Down at the bottom of the barrel, we come upon "The Black Robe," on NBC-TV, Mondays at 8:30. The title refers to a judge's gown, the proceedings are supposed to show the atmosphere of night court with its parade of the unfortunate and the fallen. Here is exhibited the grime of the gutter as it appears on a cast literally dug out of dives and joints and doorways. These drunks and eccentrics are paraded before the cameras on the theory that there is "realism" in their faces, naturalism in their broken Bowery pidgin. The program is dedicated to the morbid curiosity of the crowd that collects around a dead body in the street.

"Hollywood Calling," NBC's contribution to culture, is on the radio for a full hour Sunday evenings from 6:30 to 7:30. It's another giant swag-bag program, the jackpot reaching something like $31,000 worth of goodies as the reward for the lucky telephone subscriber who knows the name of the "Film of Fortune." A Los Angeles reader has written that she considers this program "fatuous." It is not quite that, if my dictionary is any authority. I find the unfriendly word defined as something "foolish, especially in an unconscious, complacent manner." "Hollywood Calling" is completely deliberate.

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On the radio side of ABC you will find that Kate Smith and her partner, Ted Collins, now chat, spin records, and chat some more Monday nights between 9 and 10 and again from 10:15 to 11. Some of the records aren't bad—they couldn't be as insipid as the conversation of this pair of skywave idlers. I suppose that what saves ABC's transmitter from total collapse during Monday night's vapid two-hour stretch is the fact that, from 10 to 10:15, while Collins and Miss Smith are resting from their taxing work, one of the week's liveliest commentators, Arthur Gaeth, brings some substance to the microphone with a news review.

Radio has given us also:

"The Ethel Merman Show," NBC, Sundays at 9:30. Several good actors, outstanding among them Leon Janney, try hard to trick Miss Merman into being funny. Milton Katims and his orchestra do well in the music department.

"Chicken Every Sunday," NBC, Wednesdays at 8. Billie Burke and Harry Von Zell playing out of character, but doing nicely in nostalgic stuff. Nothing heroic, but passable.

"Four-Star Playhouse," NBC, Sundays at 8. Romance is offered by Fred MacMurray, Robert Cummings, Rosalind Russell and Loretta Young, at least one of whom is on the program each round. The stories are not cheap pulp stuff only because they were first published in *Cosmopolitan*, which, as everyone knows, is a slick. The yarns themselves vary from competent to sticky.

There is much more—on television as well as on radio—but I'm afraid it's just more of the same.

SAUL CARSON

MOVIES: Storm over Widmark

THE BEST THING in "Slattery's Hurricane" is the hurricane, but unfortunately it is also the least thing. The scenes reproducing Naval Weather Bureau aerial storm reconnaissance off the coast of Florida have the fine validity that Hollywood almost always brings to technical adventure. Twice during the picture, planes fight their way through the shattering violence of a hurricane to reach the magical—and momentary—peace of the storm's "eye." These moments of calm in the midst of dreadful uproar are tremendously effective; they make it the more unpleasant to return to the small tripe of the "human drama" that occupies the bulk of the film.

The plot we must concern ourselves with presents Richard Widmark in a familiar adolescent quandary. He cannot choose between Veronica Lake, looking much like a damp kitten, and Linda Darnell, who looks just fine but suffers the impediment of being married to Widmark's best friend. Widmark, whose moral regeneration in "Down to the Sea in Ships" so disconcerted the admirers of his brand of giggling villainy, has suffered a relapse, but he is not again entirely lost to honor.

As the hero-heel (Hollywood's latest contribution to the Faust legend), he drinks a good deal, takes to smuggling dope to distract his attention from the hideous problem, and receives the Navy Cross for having sunk a Jap cruiser some years earlier. He also flies through a hurricane in a small commuter plane, and that feat may annoy any weather pilots who chance to see the picture. In the end, recalling that he is still a reserve officer, and thus presumably a reserve gentleman, Widmark reënlists for Guam and glory, leaving Miss Lake on the airstrip, limper than ever but with a hope in her heart. Navy publicity may be pleased by this solution to a sordid civilian problem (Join the Navy and Square Your Triangles), but it seemed a let-down after the fine storms.

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

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